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Preface 
This paper reviews the current state of the debate on EU budget and policy reform, and 
developments during 2008-09, focusing in particular on the future of Cohesion policy after 
2013. The paper was prepared by the European Policies Research Centre (EPRC) under the 
aegis of EoRPA (European Regional Policy Research Consortium), which is a grouping of 
national government authorities from countries across Europe. The Consortium provides 
sponsorship for the EPRC to undertake regular monitoring and comparative analysis of the 
regional policies of European countries and the inter-relationships with EU Cohesion and 
Competition policies. EoRPA members currently comprise the following partners: 
Austria 
x Bundeskanzleramt (Federal Chancellery), Vienna 
 
Finland 
x Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö (Ministry of Employment and Economy), Helsinki 
 
France 
x Délégation interministérielle à l'aménagement et à la compétitivité des territoires 
(DIACT), Paris 
 
Germany 
x Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (Federal Ministry for Economics and 
Labour), Berlin 
x Ministerium für Wirtschaft, Mittelstand und Energie des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen 
(Ministry of Economics, SMEs and Energy of the Land of Nordrhein-Westfalen) 
 
Italy 
x Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico (Ministry of Economic Development), 
Dipartimento per lo sviluppo e la coesione economica (Department for Development 
and Economic Cohesion), Rome 
 
Netherlands 
x Ministerie van Economische Zaken (Ministry of Economic Affairs), The Hague 
 
Norway 
x Kommunal-Og Regionaldepartementet (Ministry of Local Government and Regional 
Development), Oslo 
 
Poland 
x Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego (Ministry of Regional Development), Warsaw 
 
Sweden 
x Näringsdepartementet (Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications), 
Stockholm 
 
United Kingdom 
x Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, London 
x The Scottish Government, Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning Department, 
Glasgow 
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The research for this paper was undertaken by EPRC in consultation with EoRPA partners. It 
involved a programme of desk research and fieldwork visits among national and regional 
authorities in sponsoring countries and European institutions during Spring/Summer 2008. 
The paper was originally prepared for the annual EoRPA meeting in October 2009. 
The paper has been drafted by Professor John Bachtler, Carlos Mendez and Fiona Wishlade. 
It draws on country-specific research contributed by the following research team: 
x Dr Sara Davies (Germany) x Dr Irene McMaster and Dr Katja Mirwaldt 
(EU12) together with country specialists 
x Dr Martin Ferry (Poland) x Carlos Mendez (Portugal, Spain) 
x Dr Martin Ferry & Rona Michie (United 
Kingdom) 
x Dr Katja Mirwaldt and Frederike Gross 
(Luxembourg) 
x Frederike Gross (France) x Laura Polverari (Italy) 
x Frederike Gross and Dr Katja Mirwaldt 
(Belgium) 
x Viktoria Chorafa (Greece) 
x Professor Henrik Halkier (Denmark) x Heidi Vironen (Finland, Sweden) 
x Stefan Kah (Austria) x Professor Douglas Yuill (The 
Netherlands, Norway) 
x Dr Irene McMaster (Ireland)  
Many thanks to everyone who participated in the research. The European Policies Research 
Centre also gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by Sponsors of the 
EoRPA Consortium. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The budget review was concluded in late 2008 with the assertion that radical reform is 
necessary. A refocusing of spending on future challenges is considered necessary to shift 
the centre of gravity of the budget towards the priorities of competitiveness, environment 
and energy. A fair and transparent mechanism of contributions was also seen as important, 
replacing the current web of corrections. Flexibility was advocated, so that the budget 
has improved capacity to respond to evolving challenges. 
Radical reform, while politically difficult, would have major implications for the two policy 
areas which account for most of the EU budget  the Common Agricultural Policy and 
Cohesion policy. In both policy areas stakeholders have been searching for ways to defend 
the policies, although with quite different approaches in the two policy areas. With respect 
to the CAP, there is broad agreement on the need for further reform; most Member States 
foresee cuts in agricultural spending, but there remains significant support for continued 
direct payments to farmers. Cohesion policy also has strong support, with major differences 
on whether and how it should be reformed. There is universal agreement on concentrating 
funds on less developed Member States and regions, but some wish to end funding in richer 
countries, while others consider it important that all Member States continue to benefit 
from the policy.  
Since the consultation on the budget review was concluded, the policy debate has largely 
left the question of Cohesion policy resourcing to one side and has focused instead on 
justifying the role played by Cohesion policy, the objectives and rationale of the policy and 
how its implementation and instruments might be improved. The strategy of DG REGIO has 
been to use much of the past year or so for analytical work  notably through the ex post 
evaluation of Cohesion policy, the preparation of the Regions 2020 document, and an 
independent assessment of the policy provided by the Barca Report.  
Based on this background work, some broad outlines of DG REGIO thinking have been 
sketched out by Commissioner Hübner, in particular a reflections paper presented to the 
informal meeting of regional policy ministers under the Czech Presidency. Key principles of 
DG REGIO thinking are: consolidation of the paradigm shift in Cohesion policy, with a 
stronger focus on narrowly defined core priorities  linked to innovation, entrepreneurship 
and development of integrated local strategies; a greater focus on results; reinforcement of 
the added value of Cohesion policy; and the strengthening and simplification of delivery 
mechanisms. 
DG REGIO are now convening a high-level group of Member State directors of regional policy 
with a view to discussing the reflections paper during Autumn 2009. The intention is to set 
out conclusions and proposals in the Fifth Cohesion Report due for publication in late 2010. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For the past year, the debate on the future of Cohesion policy has been in a period of 
transition. The consultations on the budget review and on Cohesion policy were concluded 
in 2008, but a Commission position on the future of the budget is not expected until a new 
Commission has been appointed, while the DG REGIO proposals on the reform of Cohesion 
policy are not due until late 2010 as part of the Fifth Cohesion Report.  
In the interim, DG REGIO has been engaged in a period of analysis and reflection. A review 
of the longer term challenges facing EU regions was published in the Regions 2020 
document, indicating how globalisation, demographic change, climate change and energy 
security will affect individual regions. The Sixth Progress Report provided a shorter term 
perspective with an update on the economic and social situation in the regions. The debate 
on territorial cohesion also took a step forward with the publication of a Green Paper, 
without conclusively settling the debate on how the term should be interpreted or its 
implications for Cohesion policy.  
The performance of the policy has been under scrutiny in the largest ex post evaluation 
exercise ever conducted. The first results are starting to appear, and more studies will be 
completed in the course of 2010. While the research is providing valuable insights into the 
contribution of the policy in different sectors and countries, the quality of the data on 
which the evaluations rely may not be sufficient to provide a convincing rebuttal to the 
academic studies which have questioned the effectiveness of the policy  or the questions 
about the policys added value raised by the broader research conducted on EU spending as 
part of the budget review. 
Providing a link between analysis and reform is the Barca Report. Conducted over the 2008-
09 period, the Report constituted an independent re-assessment of the justification for the 
policy, the evidence of its effectiveness and proposals for change. The Report had a 
significant influence on a first statement of DG REGIO thinking by Commissioner Hübner in a 
reflections paper produced in March 2009, outlining some principles for a post-2013 
Cohesion policy. Other contributions to the debate have also appeared, although more from 
academics/think tanks than from Member States which have mostly said little since their 
submissions to the budget review. The Member States did however agree a communiqué on 
the future of the policy at an informal ministers meeting under the Czech Presidency. A 
high-level discussion between DG REGIO and Member States is also getting underway 
possibly leading to an orientations paper by Commissioner Paweã Samecki before the end 
of 2009. 
Missing from all of the above, however, is an assessment of the implications of the 
economic crisis for Cohesion policy. Responding to the crisis has been the principal task for 
the EU over the past year, with Cohesion policy playing a significant part in the European 
recovery package. The length, severity and regional impact of the crisis are still unclear, 
and the consequences will reshape the maps of regional disadvantage with intensified 
problems for some regions, new areas of vulnerability as well as new regional opportunities. 
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The budget review will also be affected, on the one hand by reconsideration of EU priorities 
and, on the other hand, by the impact of the crisis on growth and government finances. 
These developments are explored in more detail in this annual review of the Cohesion 
policy debate.1 It is the latest in a series of papers produced as part of the EoRPA research 
programme in recent years.2 
The paper begins with a summary of the state-of-play with the budget review (Section 2), 
covering the conclusions of the consultation exercise and the main Member State positions 
expressed, focusing specifically on the two largest elements of the budget  the Common 
Agricultural Policy and Cohesion policy. The paper then reviews the analytical work 
conducted under the auspices of DG Regio (Section 3) and the emerging thinking within the 
DG on the directions of reform (Section 4). The final section draws out issues as a basis for 
discussion at the EoRPA meeting (Section 5). 
                                                 
1 The exception is the regional impact of the crisis and policy responses, which are covered in the 
accompanying EoRPA Paper 09/1: Davies S, Kah s and Woods C (2009) Regional Dimensions of the 
Financial and Economic Crisis, EPRC, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
2 See for example: Bachtler J, Mendez C and Wishlade F (2008) Ideas for Budget and Policy Reform: 
Reviewing the Debate on Cohesion Policy 2014+, EoRPA Paper 08/4, European Regional Policy 
Research Consortium, EPRC, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. Bachtler J and Mendez C (2007) 
Renewing Cohesion Policy: Recent Progress and Long-Term Challenges, EoRPA Paper 07/03, European 
Regional Policy Research Consortium, EPRC, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. Bachtler J, Mendez C 
and Wishlade F (2007)New Budget, New Regulations, New Strategies: The Reform of EU Cohesion 
Policy, EoRPA Paper 07/03, European Regional Policy Research Consortium, EPRC, University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow. 
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2. THE DEBATE ON THE EU BUDGET  
2.1 The EU budget review 
On 3 September 2009, Commission President Barroso sent his political guidelines for the 
mandate of the next European Commission to the president of the European Parliament.3 In 
a wide-ranging speech, setting out a transformational agenda and focusing particularly on 
unemployment and global leadership, Barroso restated the need for the EU budget to be 
reshaped to respond to new priorities. He envisaged the budget review being used as a 
stepping stone for the 2014+ Multiannual Financial Framework. In more direct language 
than he has used before, the Commission President was forthright in calling for change on 
both the expenditure and revenue sides of the EU budget: 
Designing the next financial framework will not be an easy exercise  while 
everyone agrees in the abstract on the need for reform, as soon as the debate 
moves to concrete measures, there seems to be a strong bias in favour of the 
status quo. So before entering into the specifics, such as whether to change the 
current seven year cycle, I want to get agreement with the European Parliament 
and Council on three key principles to serve as ground rules for the debate: 
x The EU budget must focus on activities which produce genuine European 
added value. Beyond political considerations, efficiency criteria must help 
prioritise EU spending activities in terms of their added value (for instance 
on the basis of cross-border effects, economies of scale, or resolving 
market failures). 
x We need to move away from a narrow focus on net balances and move 
towards an approach based on solidarity, burden-sharing and equity which 
is comprehensive and shared by all. 
x The stability of the financial framework needs to be counterbalanced by a 
far greater degree of flexibility so as to enable the Union to respond 
effectively to new challenges and needs. 
This reflection cannot shirk the issue of "own resources", a system of EU financing 
that has evolved piecemeal into a confusing and opaque mix of contributions and 
rebates. We need to see how the EU can find a more efficient and transparent way 
of financing its policies, and to simplify delivery in order to maximise the impact 
of spending while safeguarding the principles of sound financial management. 
In a document which by its nature was general  and criticised by some as a vague wish 
list  and lacking new ideas4  the references to the budget review implied a more radical 
                                                 
3 Political guidelines for the next Commission, José Manuel Barroso, 3.9.09 
4 Guidelines  or empty promises? European Voice, 10.9.2009. Barroso tested before vote on second 
term, Financial Times, ft.com, 9.9.09 
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approach than the somewhat tentative language used at the conclusion of the budget 
consultation in November 2008.5   
The Commission Presidents political programme is dependent on the appointment of a new 
team of Commissioners. It does, however, mark the resumption of open discussion on the 
future of the EU budget after almost a year when the budget review was effectively shelved 
in a political environment dominated by the economic crisis, continued uncertainty on the 
ratification of the Reform Treaty, the European Parliament elections and debate on the re-
appointment of the Commission President. The original timetable for a final report on the 
review (late 2008/early 2009) has slipped. Further, the initial intention of separating the 
review exercise from the discussions on the next financial perspective has been superseded 
by an acceptance that the review is kicking off the debate on post-2013 financial planning. 
The budget review was originally launched by the Commission President in September 2007 
with a consultation paper described as a unique opportunity to reassess the direction of 
the EU and its policy and budgetary priorities.6  The review prompted extensive academic 
and policy debate on the future political and policy direction of the EU, and was 
summarised as follows.7  
1. The primary conclusion was the need for change. There was a general recognition 
that the structure of the budget does not reflect the EUs political objectives and 
policy priorities. In broad terms, the consultation indicated a need for increased 
spending on the environment, energy and competitiveness, research and knowledge 
 as well as greater cross-policy coherence in meeting EU goals in these areas  and 
a reduction or reorientation of CAP spending towards rural development and other 
contemporary policy objectives.  
2. On the revenue side of the budget, the budget debate promoted extensive 
discussion of the own resources of the EU. There was considerable support for some 
kind of EU tax, but others were strongly opposed on theoretical, empirical and 
political grounds. While there was a widespread view that correction mechanisms 
should be avoided, it was also recognised that some method for dealing with 
Member State concerns on net balances is required. 
3. The budget review prompted contributions on how to manage change to the budget 
and EU policies. Many contributors emphasised the need for better independent 
assessment and understanding of the efficiency and effectiveness of policies 
(notably impact) as part of a more structured and systematic approach to making 
expenditure decisions. 
                                                 
5 See for example: Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe, Speech by the Commission President to 
European Commission Conference on the future of the European Budget, 12.11.2008, Brussels. 
6 European Commission,  Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe: A Public Consultation Paper in 
View of the 2008/2009 Budget Review, Communication from the Commission, Brussels, SEC(2007) 
1188, 12.9.2007 
7 Bachtler and Mendez (2008) op. cit. 
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A final assessment of the consultation was undertaken in November 2008, with a report 
from the Commission8 and a major conference9. The main lesson drawn was that radical 
reform is necessary, with a refocusing of spending on future challenges and shifting the 
centre of gravity of the budget towards the priorities of competitiveness, environment and 
energy. A fair and transparent mechanism of contributions was also seen as important, 
replacing the current web of corrections. Flexibility was advocated, so that the budget 
has improved capacity to respond to evolving challenges. 
2.2 Ideas for budgetary reform 
The prospect of radical reform has prompted considerable debate in the academic research 
and policy literatures on different ideas for reshaping the EU budget.10 A first general 
conclusion to emerge is the need for a new approach to budgeting. To address the net 
balances or juste retour problem, one well-known proposal is for the creation of a two-
staged budgeting procedure to decouple discussions about overall funding from 
redistributive questions, along with a mechanism of horizontal transfers across Member 
States that aligns net balances with relative prosperity (in real income per capita terms) to 
ensure solidarity and equity among countries.11 The introduction of a corrective mechanism 
is also supported by other analysts,12 some of whom have additionally proposed a 
restructuring of the budget into three types or chapters of expenditure. This is in line with 
Musgraves distinction between redistribution (here concerning Cohesion policy and the 
CAP), allocation (all other EU public goods) and stabilisation (EU capital expenditure)13 - 
each with a different source of funding (including the creation of a European tax for 
financing EU public goods).14  
This latter proposal has generated a lively debate among several commentators, who have 
raised several criticisms.  
x First, while such classificatory systems (i.e. distinguishing between different types 
of expenditure) may be analytically useful, they do not reflect the inherent reality 
                                                 
8 European Commission (2008) Consultation report: Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe: Short 
Summary of Contributions, Working document prepared by the Secretariat-General and DG Budget, 
Brussels, SEC(2008) 2739, 3.11.2008 
9 European Commission Conference Reforming the budget, changing Europe, 12 November 2008, 
Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/conference/documents_en.htm  
10 This review updates the previous overview (in Bachtler et al (2008) op. cit.) but with a stronger 
focus on more recent contributions to the debate that have emerged during late 2008 and 2009. 
11 De la Fuente A, Domènech R. & Rant V. (2008) Addressing the net balances as a prerequisite for EU 
budget reform: A proposal, Paper presented at the BEPA conference on EU public finance, Brussels, 
3-4 April 2008. 
12 Heinemann, F., P. Mohl and S. Osterloh (2008) Reform Options for the EU Own Resources System, 
ZEW Economic Studies, Bd. 40, Heidelberg; Iozzo A, Micossi S & Salvemini M T. (2008) A new budget 
for the European Union? CEPS Policy Brief 159. 
13 See also: ECORYS, CPB and IFO (2008) A Study on EU Spending, Final Report to DG Budget, European 
Commission, Brussels; and the work of Fritz Breuss cited in Breuss F (2008) Mehrwert der EU-
Ausgaben, Paper to the European Commission Conference Reforming the budget, changing Europe, 12 
November 2008, Brussels, 
14 Iozzo et al. (2008) op. cit. 
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of public policies which inevitably exhibit overlapping expenditure functions and 
often involve the targeting of single objectives through multiple instruments.15  
x Second, the creation of a European tax as a new source of EU funding may be 
appealing from a technical perspective, but so far has little support among Member 
States, and still raises the politically charged question of which type of European 
tax is most appropriate.16  
x Third, it is argued that the net balances problem would not be eliminated as the 
Member States would still seek to calculate their overall returns on the basis of 
each of the three expenditure chapters.17 Equally, corrective mechanisms are 
criticised for the possibility of introducing perverse incentives, such as encouraging 
Member States to minimise Cohesion receipts in the knowledge of a proportionate 
increase in funding through the mechanism, which would become relatively more 
attractive given the absence of conditionalities under such transfers.18 
As part of the proposals for a new budgeting process, it is argued that the timing of the 
Financial Perspectives should be aligned with the legislative periods of the European 
Parliament and Commission. It is hoped that this would raise the political profile and, 
potentially, the legitimacy of the process and outcomes.19 Others, however, do not regard 
this as a desirable end or consider it to be counter-productive, especially if the EU is seen 
as deriving its legitimacy from effective outputs rather than democratic inputs.20 Similarly, 
and with more general implications, it is argued that EU budgetary reform solutions derived 
from federal theories developed from the experiences of nation states may be of limited 
applicability to the EU given its unique characteristics.21  
A second key strand of the budget review literature is the question of European added 
value. This is closely tied to debates over the European public good character of 
expenditure (as well as the presence or not of economies of scale/scope and externalities), 
increasingly highlighted as the main legitimate criterion for the inclusion of expenditure in 
the EU budget.22 Climate change is argued to be a particularly promising candidate, not 
just on theoretical grounds but also because EU citizens could be more easily persuaded 
                                                 
15 Le Cacheux J (2009) Reaction to Iozzo et al., Notre Europe, Paris; Tarschys (2009) Reaction to Iozzo 
et al., Notre Europe, Paris ; Zuleeg (2009a) ; Reaction to Iozzo et al., Notre Europe, Paris ; Pietras J 
(2009) Reaction to Iozzo et al., Notre Europe, Paris  
16 Le Cacheux J (2009) op. cit. 
17 Osterloh S (2009) Reaction to Iozzo et al., Notre Europe, Paris; Zuleeg (2009a) op. cit.;  
18 Osterloh S (2009) op.cit ; Notre Europe (2009) Reaction to Iozzo et al., Notre Europe, Paris  
19 Iozzo et al (2008) op. cit; Tarschys (2009) op. cit. 
20 Menon A (2009) Europe: The State of the Union, presentation at EPRC seminar, University of 
Stratchlyde, Glasgow.  
21 Pietras J (2009) op. cit. 
22 ECORYS, CPB and IFO (2008) A Study on EU Spending, Final Report to DG Budget, European 
Commission, Brussels 
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about the need to address such a theme at EU level.23 That being said, defining what 
constitutes an EU public good is difficult24 and, indeed, can change over time.25 Instead of 
debating and deciding in advance what constitutes a European public good, it has been 
suggested that the issue could be more easily resolved by leaving it to the Member States to 
decide in the Council on the basis of a unanimous decision,26 although there is hardly any 
other alternative forum for such a decision.  
The issue of EU added value and public goods has been at the heart of re-assessments of 
current EU policies. A study undertaken for the Commissions DG Budget as part of the 
review assessed EU policies and expenditure profiles with respect to: normative criteria 
from an economic efficiency perspective (economies of scale, externalities and 
heterogeneity of preferences); positive criteria from a public choice/political economy 
perspective (such as limits to system competition, second-best arguments, 
complementarity between policies and lobbying); as well as considering political and 
bureaucratic arguments of vested interests and path dependency. On the basis of this 
assessment: 
x no (or insignificant) change to current expenditure levels was recommended for the 
policy areas of stabilisation, social policies, competitiveness (most areas) and single 
market, education and culture, fisheries, health and consumer policy, and freedom, 
security and justice; 
x downward change was recommended for Cohesion policy (but only for the Regional 
Competitiveness and Employment Objective, while retaining the current funding 
levels for the Convergence and Territorial Cooperation Objectives) and for 
agriculture and rural development; and  
x by contrast, a budgetary boost was recommended for the areas of environment, 
research (except where targeting SMEs), maritime, defence, foreign policies, and 
infrastructure/network industries. However, this would not imply an overall 
increase in public spending in the EU in all areas as in some cases it is 
recommended that domestic spending be shifted from the national level to the EU 
level (in areas of R&D, Transport and Energy and Foreign Aid). 
A similar study undertaken for the Dutch Ministries of Finance, Economics Affairs and 
Agriculture also employed these types of criteria to assess EU expenditure, as derived from 
                                                 
23 Begg I (2009a) EU Expenditure to Support Transitions to a Low Carbon Economy, EU Consent EU 
Budget Working Paper No. 9, May; Begg I (2009b) Reaction to Iozzo, Micossi and Salvemini, A New 
Budget for the European Union? Notre Europe.  
24 Zuleeg (2009b) The Economic Rationale for EU Action: What are European Public Goods? 
background paper for presentation at the BEPA Workshop The political economy of EU public 
finances: designing governance for change, 5 February 2009, Brussels; Le Cacheux J (2009) op. cit; 
Tarschys (2009) op. cit.  
25 Santos I and Neheider  S (2009) Reframing the EU Budget Decision-Making Process, Bruegel Working 
Paper 2009/03, Bruegel, Brussels. 
26 Ibid.  
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theories of public choice, fiscal federalism and political arguments.27 The conclusions of 
the study for each of the policy areas considered are that:  
x there is a convincing case for limiting Structural Funds support to poorer Member 
States, although no stance is taken on the appropriate level of funding;  
x direct payments under the CAP should be phased out, while rural development 
programmes should target the underlying objectives more explicitly and be 
realigned with Structural Funds programmes;  
x EU support for the environment should be targeted at projects with strong 
spillovers and only when taxes or regulation do not suffice;  
x higher levels of EU funding are required for public research, with the focus on 
supporting high quality basic research; and  
x increases in spending are needed under foreign policies and internal security 
policies, although there are difficulties in formulating collective policies. 
A final theme to emerge from the academic literature and other studies is that radical 
change is unlikely. The feasibility of some (if not most) of the proposals put forward is 
regarded as being politically difficult to agree in practice, notwithstanding the desirability 
of advancing and debating optimum reform options.28 Indeed, if history is any guide, there 
is clearly a strong bias towards the status quo in EU budget negotiations, as illustrated in 
overviews of the budgets evolution which typically employ path-dependency arguments.29 
Related, the implementation of any meaningful reform of the budget structure may need 
to be oiled by an increase in budgetary size  since it would be necessary to ensure a 
Pareto condition that no one should lose in absolute amounts.30 Despite the presence of 
new challenges, the fiscal restraint being imposed across Member States own budgets in 
the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis is likely to militate against any sizeable 
increase in the EU budget.31 One solution is to adopt a gradually feasible approach 
involving gradual but persistent changes to the budget in the direction sought.32 
 
                                                 
27 Copenhagen Economics (2009) EU Budget Review: Options for Change, Report to the Dutch 
Ministries of Finance, Economics Affairs and Agriculture, Netherlands 
28 Zuleeg (2009a) op. cit; Osterloh S (2009) op. cit.   
29 ECORYS et al (2008) op. cit; Pollack M (2008) Member State Principals, Supranational Agents, and 
the EU Budgetary Process, 1970-2008, paper prepared for presentation at the Conference on Public 
Finances in the European Union, sponsored by the European Commission Bureau of Economic Policy 
Advisors, Brussels, 3-4 April 2008. 
30 Micossi S and Salvemini M.T (2009) Some responses to the comments, Notre Europe, Paris. 
31 Cf. Micossi S and Salvemini M.T (2009) Ibid. 
32 ECORYS et al (2008) op.cit. Pietras J (2008) The future of the EU Budget: In search of coherence of 
objectives, policies and finances of the Union, demosEUROPA  Centre for European Strategy, 
Warsaw. 
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2.3 Political debates 
On the political front, while the formal budget review may have progressed little, the past 
year has focused attention on the urgency of EU action in several areas. Successive Council 
conclusions have highlighted the importance of immediate recovery from the economic 
crisis and the imperative of dealing with unemployment, and also the longer term 
challenges of improving the competitiveness of the European economy, addressing the 
consequences of climate change, increasing energy security, and managing migration. This 
has clear implications for the two policy areas which account for the majority of the EU 
budget  the Common Agricultural Policy and Cohesion policy  and in both policy areas 
stakeholders have been searching for ways of defending the policies, although with quite 
different approaches in the two policy areas. 
Under the CAP, following the DG AGRI health check in 2008, Member States took the 
initiative under the French Presidency to formulate a series of positions and visions on the 
future of EU policies for agriculture and rural development. Several countries have been 
actively lobbying to secure some agreement on policy directions for the CAP in advance of 
conclusions of the budget review (see Section 2.4).  
By contrast, under Cohesion Policy individual Member States have been less active over the 
past year, following consultations on Cohesion policy and input to the budget review in 
2007-08. Instead, it has been DG REGIO which has taken the initiative to demonstrate the 
need for change and the role that Cohesion policy can play in meeting EU priorities. At the 
heart of this strategy has been an independent study (the Barca Report) which analysed 
the current performance of the policy and set out options for change. A succession of 
speeches by (former) Commissioner Danuta Hübner also laid out key themes for discussion 
on the future of the policy (discussed in more detail in subsequent sections).  The following 
sections provide a summary of Member State views on the CAP and Cohesion policy based 
on the consultation exercises. 
2.4 Consultation outcomes: Member State perspectives on the CAP 
During the budget review consultation process, the Common Agricultural Policy was the 
subject of most comment, with broad agreement on the need for further reform.33 Most 
respondents advocated cuts in agricultural spending, impacting particularly on the first 
pillar (agricultural subsidies); many wanted a shift in funding from pillar 1 to 2; and some 
proposed that pillar 2 (rural development) should be more closely aligned with Cohesion 
policy. There was, however, no general agreement on the future of direct payments to 
farmers under pillar 1: some wanted to see them phased out; others argued for the 
equitable treatment of old and new Member States; and many saw problems arising from 
the co-financing of pillar 1 and the potential re-nationalisation of the policy. There was, 
however, a clear expectation in most submissions of lower agricultural spending overall. 
                                                 
33 European Commission (2008) op. cit. Section 2.3. 
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Reviewing the responses of individual Member States, it is clear that there remains 
significant support for the CAP across the EU, even though most countries accept the need 
for review and revision.  
x There was explicit support for the CAP from a number of Central and Eastern 
European Member States (for instance, Poland, Hungary and Romania),34 the four 
former or present EU15 Cohesion countries (Portugal, Spain, Greece and Ireland)35 
as well as Belgium, France36 and Cyprus.  
x Other countries emphasised the need for some CAP reform. Within this group, 
several countries stated they are open to policy reform discussions  Estonia, Italy, 
Finland, Germany and Latvia.37  
x A third group of countries favoured substantial review and reform of the CAP. 
These include: the Czech Republic (which argued that the debate on the future of 
the CAP needs to be a comprehensive one), Denmark,38 Malta (which highlighted 
the need for further CAP reform, starting from a thorough review of the current 
levels and use of financing from the EU budget), the Netherlands,39 Sweden (which 
envisaged substantial reforms to the CAP, leading to much lower expenditure) and 
the United Kingdom (which suggested that spending under pillar 1 of the CAP should 
be phased out). 
In terms of the directions of reform, most Member States favoured shifting funds from pillar 
1 (agricultural subsidies) to pillar 2 (rural development). This was mentioned explicitly in 
                                                 
34 Hungary stated that a well-functioning common agricultural policy  is important for Hungary; 
Poland highlights the transition of the CAP into a modern policy strengthening competitiveness and 
supporting both climate change and food security; and Romania drew attention to the long-term 
commitment to agriculture under the CAP and the need for such commitment to be shown also in 
respect of the new Member States. 
35 Portugal emphasised the strategic relevance of CAP support, the ongoing reforms to the system and 
the revisions in train which will furnish CAP with the necessary instruments to meet the challenges 
posed to the agricultural sector and society in general; Greece viewed the CAP as important and 
favoured more funding for pillar 2, but through additional funding being provided rather than at the 
expense of pillar 1; Spain argued strongly that CAP reform must not be considered until the British 
and other rebates are removed  and pointed to the far-reaching effects that changes to CAP 
instruments could potentially have on society; and Ireland expressed its commitment to maintaining a 
strong and effective CAP, with only the very gradual introduction of any new initiatives. 
36 On the other hand, while stressing the strategic importance of Europes agriculture and food 
security, the French submission adopted a low-key approach to the CAP. 
37 Italy pointed out that 70 percent of agricultural support in Europe comes from the EU budget and 
argued that the aims and instruments under the CAP need to be reviewed to, amongst other things, 
decide on the appropriate breakdown between EU and national support; Germany recognised the 
need for a CAP to maintain a diverse agricultural sector but noted that the reform process will have 
to continue and intensify after 2013; and Finland made the case for an open-minded review of the 
CAP. 
38 Denmark strongly favours the phasing out of direct subsidies and proposes a limited transfer from 
pillar 1 to pillar 2.  
39 The Dutch submission also saw a continuing need for a European policy aimed at agriculture and 
rural areas, but suggested a range of areas for reform (including removing trade-distorting 
instruments and phasing out support for uncompetitive farming (unless it has a social function). 
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the submissions from Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Lithuania,40 and Estonia. Related, a wide 
range of countries emphasised the importance of ongoing support for rural development: 
Germany, Austria, Finland,41 Sweden,42 Greece,43 Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Malta and Cyprus. For its part, against the backdrop of climate change, 
the UK favoured a reshaped pillar 2 focusing on the delivery of environmental benefits. Five 
countries explicitly referred to the synergies to be gained from bringing rural development 
and Cohesion policy closer together  Germany, Denmark and Sweden as well as the Slovak 
and Czech Republics. 
It is notable that a significant number of the new Member States highlighted the current 
differences in treatment between the EU15 and the new Member States under the CAP and 
argued for these inequalities to be removed. Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, 
the Czech Republic and Malta each made this point in their submissions,  
Lastly, there were very significant differences between Member States with respect to the 
provision of co-finance under pillar 1. Those countries which argued (usually strongly) 
against co-finance included Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Romania, 
Austria, Denmark and Greece. Only two submissions (Italy and the Netherlands) explicitly 
supported co-finance for direct aids, whilst underlining their view that this is not the same 
as the renationalisation of policy. 
Since the conclusion of the budget consultation there has been further debate (especially 
among farming ministers), with some Member States taking the initiative to try and protect 
the CAP against prospective cuts. This was already evident in the modification of the CAP 
health check reforms agreed at the Agriculture Council on 20 November 2008, where  
among other concessions to Member States - the proposed diversion of farm subsidies away 
from large farmers to rural development projects was weakened, and the decoupling of 
farm subsidies from production levels was delayed in certain sectors. During 2009, France 
and Germany also pressed the Commission to reconsider the planned 2010 increase in dairy 
quotas (agreed under the health check) and to consider new forms of regulation of dairy 
prices.  
Looking to the longer term, discussions under both the French and Czech EU Presidencies 
have addressed the future of the CAP after 2013. At the informal meeting of agriculture 
ministers in Annecy (September 2008), France initiated a debate on future CAP objectives 
and subsequently published a set of French Presidency proposals seeking Council agreement 
for conclusions affirming the necessity for the European Union to continue to have after 
2013 a common and sufficiently ambitious agricultural policy.44 This was not accepted due 
                                                 
40 Lithuania noted the need to evaluate the effectiveness of pillar 2 spending and, if necessary revise 
current pillar 2 measures. 
41 Finland argued that rural development funds should be increased substantially. 
42 Sweden considered that there should be such support only in respect of genuine cross-border 
external effects and in the context of decreasing overall agricultural spending. 
43 Greece argued for enhanced funding for pillar 2, but not at the expense of pillar 1. 
44 CEU (2008a) Whats the best way to prepare the CAP of the future? General Secretariat, Council of 
the European Union, Brussels, 28.7.08, SN 3986/08. CEU (2008b) The Future of the CAP after 2013  
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to opposition from countries such as Sweden and the United Kingdom. A subsequent 
informal meeting of agricultural ministers in Brno (June 2009) also made little headway on 
this issue. 
These debates did encourage several Member States to set out their visions of the future of 
the CAP and  as in the budget consultation - brought out once again the two main fault-
lines between countries. 
x The first difference is between those Member States wanting to retain the current 
form of the CAP, with direct payments to farmers, and those governments 
(Netherlands, Sweden), advocating a more market-based approach, shifting funds 
to rural development. For example, the view of the CAP published by Finland is for 
the current structure of two pillars to be retained within an unchanged budget 
envelope, while allowing for funding to be transferred from the first to the second 
pillar.45 By contrast, the Dutch Government published an outlook to 2020 
proposing the phasing-out of the current two-pillar structure, and replacing it a 
single agriculture/horticulture fund  co-financed by national and regional 
authorities and focused on competitiveness, with support for farmers only being 
provided where it involves risk management or the maintenance of socially 
desirable values (e.g. environment, animal welfare).46   
x The second fault-line in the recent debate is between new Member States, 
pressing for a fairer system of agricultural subsidies (which currently favour EU15 
farmers greatly), and older Member States (e.g. France, Greece, Italy, Spain) who 
would prefer to see higher subsidies in the EU12 being phased in gradually.  
A further interesting development is the agreement by French and German farming 
ministers to create a joint group to study the future of the CAP after 2013. Inevitably, this 
calls to mind the Franco-German agreement on CAP funding in 2002 which pre-empted the 
subsequent negotiations on the financial perspective for 2007-13. 
2.5 Consultation outcomes: Member State perspectives on Cohesion 
policy 
Cohesion policy is an important element of the budget discussions, partly because of its 
obvious significance in expenditure terms, but also because, different from other 
components of the EU budget, it involves earmarked funding for the Member States. As a 
result, not only is the debate about the relative weighting of Cohesion policy within the EU 
budget important, but more technical aspects relating to the spatial focus of policy and its 
eligibility and allocation criteria can be of major significance to individual Member States. 
                                                                                                                                            
Adoption of Council Conclusions, Special Committee on Agriculture, Council of the European Union, 
Brussels, 27.11.08, 16287/08. 
45 The CAP after 2013, Views of the Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Finland, May 2009. 
46 European Agricultural Policy 2020: The Dutch Outlook, Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food 
Quality, The Netherlands, September 2008. 
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The Commissions summary of the budget consultation process concluded that Cohesion 
receives strong support, with, however, opinions considerably diverging on how it should be 
reformed.47 The majority of contributions favoured concentrating funds on less developed 
Member States and regions; some wished to end funding in richer countries, while others 
considered it important that all Member States continue to benefit from the policy. Another 
area of disagreement concerned the objectives of the policy  some wanted to see issues 
such as competitiveness and climate change included within the priority remit, while others 
preferred to keep the policy focused on the cohesion objective. The impact of territorial 
cohesion was also disputed. Some wanted a wider range of indicators and funding allocation 
mechanisms, but most advocated keeping GNI and GDP per head as the main criteria for 
determining eligibility and funding allocations. 
Since the consultation was concluded, there has been further debate under the French and 
Czech EU Presidencies and in the context of the Barca Report (see Section 4.2). The 
following sections review five key Cohesion policy themes: the scale of Cohesion policy 
funding; its spatial focus; policy objectives; eligibility and allocation criteria; and the issue 
of territorial cohesion.48  
2.5.1 Scale of funding 
During the budget review consultation, several net payers argued that Cohesion policy 
should become more focused (with an implied lower share of the budget). This was made 
explicit in the Dutch submission which said that funding should be concentrated in the least 
prosperous regions in the least prosperous Member States, resulting in a substantial cut in 
the share of the EU budget allocated to structural and cohesion funds.49 The Swedish 
paper similarly argued for spending to be focused on those parts of the Union in most need 
 mainly in the new Member States  leading to expenditure cuts, a prerequisite to 
accommodate spending in other policy areas.50 While the UK response did not comment on 
the volume of Cohesion spending, it similarly suggested that funding be concentrated on 
the less prosperous Member States and, indeed, that Structural Funds in the richer 
Member States should be phased out.51  
The German submission stressed the importance of overall budgetary discipline and of 
focusing Cohesion policy support. It made specific mention of Europes least-developed 
regions and stressed poor regions rather than poor countries. Underlining this point, it 
argued that any phase-out provisions for regions should be equitable, regardless of which 
                                                 
47 European Commission (2008) op. cit. Section 2.3. 
48 This was the subject of a separate consultation and subsequent Green Paper on Territorial 
Cohesion - Turning territorial diversity into strength, Communication from the Commission, 
SEC(2008) 2550, Brussels, 6.10.2008. 
49 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Priorities for a Modern EU Budget, The Hague, April 2008, page 5. 
50 Prime Ministers Office Sweden, Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe  Swedens response to 
the Commission Communication, Stockholm, 2008, page 2. 
51 HM Treasury, Global Europe: Vision for a 21st century budget, HMSO, London, 2008, page 17 
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Member State they are located in.52 Also of interest, the German response favoured more 
account being taken of absorption capacity when considering Cohesion policy, with concern 
expressed about the dangers of overheating. In the Austrian paper, general budget 
discipline was stressed (with overall expenditure in line with the long-term trend of around 
one percent of EU GNI), but no specific reference was made to the Cohesion policy budget. 
France, the final member of the group of six countries which argued for a one percent 
expenditure ceiling in the run-up to the 2007-13 budget exercise, concluded in its 
submission that budgetary discipline should be advisably tightened, whilst making no 
specific budgetary proposals with respect to Cohesion policy.53 
Elsewhere, there was little explicit mention of the volume of Cohesion policy spending. One 
exception was the Slovak submission which suggested that the Cohesion policy share of the 
budget should at least be maintained (at 35 percent). In addition, Hungary argued for 
adequate long-term Cohesion policy resources and, together with Poland, said that the EU 
budget as a whole would need to grow. Many countries underlined the importance of 
cohesion and solidarity (including the net payers) and the fundamental role played by 
Cohesion policy. On the other hand, there were differences between those countries which 
argued that solidarity should be expressed solely through Cohesion policy (as in the British, 
Dutch and Danish responses)54 and those which felt that solidarity was something for the EU 
budget as a whole (Poland, Greece, Czech Republic, Cyprus).55 With respect to specific 
policy areas, Hungary, Latvia, Romania and Malta argued that any CAP reform should be 
based on the principles of solidarity and equal treatment; Lithuania wanted to ensure that 
any focus on R&D and innovation did not lead to worsening disparities; and Greece 
cautioned against excellence criteria in this context, arguing that they must be combined 
with measures to stimulate regional potential.56 Malta was also concerned about the impact 
of excellence, arguing that it is essential to consider the ring-fencing of funds by groups of 
Member States that share similar levels of development and capacities.57 Finally, Spain 
argued for advancing an extended concept of excellence to encourage those countries 
making the greatest efforts to build up their innovation and technological capacity.58 
                                                 
52 German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Response of the German Government to the Commission 
Communication Reforming the budget, changing Europe, Translation, 7 April 2008, page 8 
53 French Government, Frances Contribution to the Public Consultation on Reforming the Budget, 
Changing Europe, 2008, page 6. 
54 The Danish response stated explicitly that it would be counterproductive if the allocation of funds 
under other EU-policies were to be based on levels of wealth. The Danish Government, The Danish 
Governments contribution to the 2008/2009 Budget Review, Courtesy translation, 2008 (page 5) 
55 For instance, Greece argued that the new budget must be mainly redistributional in nature, in 
order to meet the needs of poorer member states and regions, Greek Government, Reforming the 
Budget  Changing Europe, 2008, page 1. The Czech response emphasised solidarity, equity and equal 
treatment regardless of previous allocation or the date of accession of the respective Member 
State. Czech Government, Contribution of the Czech Republic to the debate on the EU budget 
review, June 2008, page 2. The Cypriot submission argued for the territorial dimension to be taken 
into account across the EU budget. 
56 Greek Government, Reforming the Budget  Changing Europe, 2008, page 11.  
57 Malta Government, EU Budget Review: Contribution by Malta, 2008, page 2. 
58 Spanish Government, Reply to the Issues Paper on the Policies and Budget Review, Courtesy 
translation, 2008, page 6 
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2.5.2 Spatial focus 
In the budget consultation, most countries said that policy should target poor regions 
and/or poor countries (including Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, 
Romania, Ireland France, Sweden and Finland). Denmark stated that financial support for 
poorer regions should be linked to the overall wealth of the country to a much higher 
degree than at present. Consequently a much higher percentage of the structural funds 
would be spent in relatively poor countries.59 Related, a number of Member States argued 
that richer countries should be excluded from core Cohesion policy funding (the UK and the 
Netherlands), while Sweden wished the focus to be on those parts of the Union in most 
need.60 Estonia argued that the financing of the poorer regions within richer states should 
be reconsidered.61 In contrast, the German response highlighted the importance of 
supporting poor regions irrespective of country wealth.  
A further group of countries stressed the significance of core Cohesion policy funding 
continuing to be available in all Member States (including Italy, Finland, Greece, Spain and 
Malta). This was also the tenor of the Austrian submission: The Federal Government will 
continue to pursue the concept of a fundamentally comprehensive and integrated 
structural and regional policy for more economic, social and territorial cohesion at the 
national and European level (italics added).62 Interestingly, at the informal meeting of 
regional policy ministers in April 2009, Germany stated that, while the focus should be on 
the least-developed regions (with fair transitional mechanisms for regions falling outside 
this group), Cohesion policy support should continue in all EU regions. This explicit German 
support for an all-region approach is important for the future development of policy. In 
similar vein, there was considerable support across the Member States for a broad 
continuation (or gradual evolution) of the current approach to Cohesion policy (including 
from Hungary, Italy, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Ireland). 
2.5.3 Policy objectives  
Most countries focused on the importance of reducing economic and social disparities (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, France,) or in 
ensuring that all territories were in a position to exploit their development potential 
(Italy). The Lisbon priorities were frequently mentioned (for instance, by Hungary, Poland, 
Lithuania, Spain and Italy), as was the need for Cohesion policy funding to support new 
policy areas such as climate change, demography and energy security. However, the Dutch 
submission expressed concern about this, stating that the pursuit of too many objectives 
                                                 
59 The Danish Government, The Danish Governments contribution to the 2008/2009 Budget Review, 
Courtesy translation, 2008, page 4 
60 Prime Ministers Office Sweden, Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe  Swedens response to 
the Commission Communication, Stockholm, 2008, page 4. 
61 Government of Estonia, Contribution of the Government of Estonia on the EU budget review 
consultation, 2008, page 2 
62 Austrian Federal Government EU Budget Review 2008/2009, The Austrian Federal Governments 
Contribution to the Consultation Process, Courtesy translation, April 2008, page 3 
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through cohesion policy should be avoided. The emphasis must remain on reducing 
disparities in wealth.63 
A considerable number of submissions argued for a continuation of the current objectives 
and approaches (Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Italy) and for any change to be gradual 
(Poland, Ireland). The Portuguese response warned that changes to the policy paving the 
way for new priorities to be included  only to maintain financial flows to regions or 
Member States that have already high levels of development  can not be accepted.64  
2.5.4 Eligibility and allocation criteria 
With respect to eligibility and allocation criteria, many Member State submissions favoured 
more stress on the least developed regions and countries, albeit based around current 
methodologies and approaches. Most explicitly, Romania argued for maintaining the 
principle of national and regional allocations and increasing the intensity of financial 
support per capita for the least developed Member States.65 As noted earlier, Germany 
and Denmark highlighted their support for (the current) wealth-based criteria (related to 
GNI and GDP per head), although the German submission interestingly raised the issue of 
absorption capacity, with implications for funding flows to the poorest Member States.  
Some countries made representations regarding phase-out provisions (e.g. Germany and 
Malta), while others wished to see transitional support reduced (Denmark). Estonia was 
notable for suggesting that any future Objective 2 should focus on regions where GDP per 
head is 75-100 percent of the EU average, with more prosperous regions qualifying only if 
facing structural difficulties. While a number of countries (including Cyprus) emphasised 
the territorial dimension to Cohesion policy, Member State submissions suggest there is 
limited impetus at present for moving far from current allocation and eligibility 
methodologies. 
2.5.5 Territorial cohesion 
Territorial cohesion has become an increasingly prominent theme in recent years and will 
become a shared competence between the Commission and the Member States if the 
pending (Lisbon) Reform Treaty is adopted. However, it remains a disputed concept, with 
some countries relating it to polycentric and endogenous development, others viewing it in 
relation to a balanced development model, some considering it in the context of enhanced 
accessibility and others seeing it as a form of networking.66 These divergent views also have 
implications for the budget debate and, in particular, for the extent to which the particular 
                                                 
63 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Priorities for a Modern EU Budget, The Hague, April 2008, page 5. 
64 Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Contribution of the Portuguese Government to the Public 
Consultation on the EU Budget Review, 2008, page 4. 
65 Romanian Government, Romanian Government contribution to the public consultation process on 
the EU budget review, 2008, page 2. 
66 Mirwaldt K, McMaster I and Bachtler J, Reconsidering Cohesion Policy: The Contested Debate on 
Territorial Cohesion, European Policy Research Papers, No. 66, EPRC, University of Strathclyde, 2009. 
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geographical handicaps facing certain Member States might be taken into account in the 
budget negotiations.  
In the responses to the budget consultation exercise,67 the divergent views amongst the 
Member States were obvious.68 Some suggested that the territorial cohesion concept was 
already incorporated within current objectives of Cohesion policy (especially those relating 
to territorial cooperation) - with the result that GNI/GDP per capita could continue to be 
the key criteria for determining eligibility and financial allocations. However, others argued 
that more specific criteria should now come into play relating both to national handicaps 
and to the potential impact of other challenges (including those mentioned subsequently in 
the Regions 2020 report: globalisation, climate change, demographic change and energy 
security).69. 
In the budget consultation exercise,70 only seven countries made an explicit and positive 
reference to a new territorial dimension to Cohesion policy: France, Portugal, Spain, 
Finland, Malta, Greece and Cyprus.71 The first three wish to see geographical 
characteristics taken into account under Cohesion policy not least in recognition of their 
outermost regions (all islands).72 Finland referred to the special status of the EUs 
northernmost sparsely-populated areas. The other three countries placed particular 
emphasis on the need for policy to take specific account of the challenges facing islands.  
In contrast, both Germany and Denmark argued strongly against the idea that the addition 
of territorial cohesion to the objectives of policy should impact on eligibility or allocation 
criteria under Cohesion policy. The German stance rejected the idea of including purely 
geographic factors, while the Danish submission took the view that the concept of 
territorial cohesion must not mean that certain areas have an intrinsic right to support on 
the grounds of specific geographical criteria; instead, both countries favoured a continuing 
                                                 
67 European Commission, Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe: A public consultation paper in view 
of the 2008/2009 budget review, Brussels, 12.9.2007, SEC(2007) 1188 final. The Member State 
contributions are available at http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/issues/read_en.htm. 
68 European Commission, Consultation Report: Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe: Short 
summary of conclusions, Brussels, 3.11.2008, SEC(2008) 2739 
69 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Regions 2020: An assessment of future 
challenges for EU regions, Brussels, 14.11.2008, SEC(2008) 2868 final 
70 All of the Member States made a submission except Slovenia. 
71 Poland could perhaps be added to this group. The Polish submission argued that the significance of 
cohesion should not be limited merely to bridging the development gap between less and more 
developed EU areas; explicit reference is made to Article 158 of the Treaty which, amongst other 
things, highlights the least favoured regions and islands, including rural areas. However, as noted 
further below, the Polish response to the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion suggested that Poland 
does not favour providing additional support to areas facing geographical handicaps  beyond what is 
already provided for in the Treaty. Indeed, the Polish submission argued that the Green Paper  
devotes too much attention to such areas (page 3). 
72 Portugal also stressed the idea of support for polycentric development, valuing the key role that 
certain regions play in the development of the whole territory (no region is explicitly mentioned, but 
the Portuguese authorities clearly have the Lisbon region in mind). France referred to regions 
hampered by a geographic or natural handicap. Spain argued that particular attention should be 
paid to regions with specific geographic handicaps. 
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strong reliance on wealth indicators for eligibility and allocation purposes.73 The remaining 
Member States either made no mention of territoriality (the majority) or else acknowledged 
it in a fairly tangential way by referring to economic, social and territorial cohesion.74 
The budget consultation responses were also reflected in earlier submissions relating to the 
consultation on the future of Cohesion policy;75 indeed, as might be expected, Member 
State responses to the two exercises were closely aligned. The Cohesion policy consultation 
was followed by an intermediate report on territorial cohesion produced by the French 
Presidency76 and by subsequent responses to the Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion where 
the consultation period concluded at the end of February 2009.77  
The French Presidency paper reported on the exchange of views which took place within 
the Council Structural Actions Working Party over the course of four meetings on the 
territorial dimension of Cohesion policy. The paper stated that one of the features of 
cohesion policy is its capacity to adapt to the particular needs and challenges of specific 
geographical challenges and opportunities.78 Examples were provided of the operation of 
effective partnership to this end within regions, at the multi-regional level, nationally and 
internationally (across borders).  
While the Commissions Green Paper was taken as a good basis for discussion, the Member 
States made a number of points in relation to the following themes:  
x the definition proposed for island regions which, by excluding those containing the 
capital of a Member State, led to objections from Cyprus and Malta;  
x the absence of a precise definition of territorial cohesion, viewed as important by 
some countries but certainly not by all  several take the view that a formal 
definition is unnecessary; 
                                                 
73 The German submission made specific reference to continuing to identify the least developed 
regions solely with the help of the tried and tested GDP-per-capita criterion. It continues that the 
creation of new criteria for the selection of the least developed regions could water down cohesion 
policy and diminish  efficiency. The Danish submission stated that the main criterion for support 
should continue to be the level of wealth and nothing else. This was also the view in a number of 
other submissions, such as that for Sweden. 
74 Perhaps the strongest reference in these remaining submissions is in the Czech suggestion of the 
need for a discussion of territorial cohesion, though the concept is viewed in the Czech paper mainly 
in terms of cross-border and interregional cooperation. 
75 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/conferences/4thcohesionforum/all_contrib_en.cfm?nmenu=3  
76 Council of the European Union, Intermediate report on territorial cohesion by the French 
Presidency if the European Union, Translation provided by the Presidency, 17580/08, Brussels, 23 
December 2008 
77 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/consultation/terco/contrib_en.htm  
78 Council of the European Union, Intermediate report on territorial cohesion by the French 
Presidency if the European Union, Translation provided by the Presidency, 17580/08, Brussels, 23 
December 2008, page 2. 
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x the fact that, while it is generally accepted that geography matters, several 
delegations felt that additional support is not justified by special geographical 
features per se; and  
x coordination of relevant sectoral policies with a territorial impact is critical for the 
effectiveness of Cohesion policy; 
x while there was a view that indicators of accessibility/disparity could perhaps be 
assessed at other than the regional level, such indicators should (in the view of 
several delegations) not be used to call current Structural Funds allocation criteria 
into question. 
Moreover, the consensus was that territorial cohesion is of most relevance to the territorial 
cooperation objective. Finally, territorial cohesion was seen also to have implications for 
sectoral policies, demanding better alignment between Cohesion policy and the territorial 
impact of other EU policies.  
These differences were reiterated in the budget consultation. Countries such as Cyprus, 
Malta, Greece, Finland (and also Sweden, given its sparsely-populated northern areas) as 
well as France and Portugal argued for provision being made under Cohesion policy for 
specific geographic features. In contrast, most of the Central and Eastern European 
countries (including the three Baltic States, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Hungary) 
were explicitly against targeting policy and/or funding at specific geographic features, as 
were EU15 Member States such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy and Germany. 
Poland was also against such targeting, arguing that the discussion of territorial cohesion 
must not come down to a list of certain regions with specific geographical features (page 
3). 
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3. PREPARING FOR THE COHESION POLICY DEBATE: 
CHALLENGES AND LESSONS 
Since the consultation on the budget review was concluded, the debate has largely left the 
question of Cohesion policy resourcing to one side and has focused instead on justifying the 
role played by Cohesion policy, the objectives and rationale of the policy and how its 
implementation and instruments might be improved. The strategy of DG REGIO has been to 
use much of the past year or so for analytical work  notably through the ex post evaluation 
of Cohesion policy, the preparation of the Regions 2020 document, and the Barca Report  
as well as the consultation on territorial cohesion, as a basis for creating some building 
blocks for policy reform that could be discussed with Member States.  
During Spring/Summer 2009, some broad outlines of DG REGIO thinking were sketched out 
by Commissioner Hübner, in particular a reflections paper presented to the informal 
meeting of regional policy ministers under the Czech Presidency. DG REGIO are now 
convening a high-level group of Member State directors of regional policy with a view to 
discussing the reflections paper during Autumn 2009. The intention is to set out conclusions 
and proposals in the Fifth Cohesion Report due for publication in late 2010. 
This section reviews the analytical and evaluation work that has been undertaken over the 
past year or so, reviewing the challenges for Cohesion policy and the lessons from the 
operation of the policy. Subsequently, Section 4 looks in more detail at the emerging 
proposals for change. 
3.1 Challenges for Cohesion policy 
3.1.1 Regions 2020 
Taking a long-term perspective on the role of Cohesion policy, the working paper Regions 
2020 on the challenges facing EU regions within a 2020 time horizon was presented by the 
Commission in December 2008.79 Produced by DG REGIO, the report provides the 
Commissions first prospective analysis of the likely regional impact of four key challenges 
confronting Europe, namely: adapting to globalisation; demographic change; climate 
change; and energy use and supply. These challenges were amongst those identified in the 
EU budget review consultation paper of September 2007, which posed the question of how 
and to what extent EU policies could best respond to the new challenges.80 The Regions 
2020 report set out a vulnerability index for European regions to each of these challenges 
                                                 
79 European Commission (2008) Commission Staff Working Document Regions 2020: An Assessment of 
Future Challenges for EU Regions, SEC(2008), Brussels 
80 European Commission (2009) Communication from the Commission, Reforming the Budget, 
Changing Europe, A Public Consultation Paper in view of the 2008/2009 Budget Review, SEC(2007) 
1188 final, Brussels 
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on the basis of a series of indicators and examines the potential differences in impacts 
across EU regions at NUTS 2 level.81 
x Globalisation. Many regions in the North-West periphery of the EU, mainly in Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark, the UK and Ireland, are predicted to benefit from globalisation 
due to high labour productivity, high employment and education levels, and a high 
share of employment in advanced sectors. Other regions located in Southern and 
Eastern Europe are more exposed due to high share of activity in low value added 
sectors and lower qualification levels. In Western and Central Europe the pattern is 
mixed, and at the subnational level metropolitan areas and capital regions are in a 
more favourable position.  
x Demographic change. The report predicts that around one-third of EU regions will 
witness population decline, mainly in Central Europe, Eastern Germany, Southern 
Italy and Northern Spain. The highest shares of old-age population are projected to 
be found in Eastern Germany, North West of Spain and some parts of Finland, while 
the lowest share of working age population are anticipated to be found in several 
regions in Finland, Sweden and Germany. 
x Climate change. The regions in the South and East of Europe will face the greatest 
challenge (the whole of Spain, Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, most 
of Romania and southern parts of France) from climate change, largely due to 
changes in rainfall and temperatures. Pressures are expected to be less significant in 
Northern and Western Europe, apart from the lowland coastal regions around the 
North Sea and the Baltic Sea. In some cases, the impact of climate change will be 
more pronounced in less- developed regions which have a lower capacity to respond.  
x Energy. The report notes that energy-related challenges are strongly influenced by 
national energy policy choices and energy mixes, and thus the energy challenge is 
largely country-specific. Nevertheless, it goes on to describe a strong core-periphery 
pattern, in which peripheral regions located mainly in Eastern and Southern Europe 
will be particularly vulnerable in terms of energy security, efficiency and 
environmental sustainability. 
The main conclusions of Regions 2020 are that there are marked differences in EU regions 
vulnerability to globalisation, demographic change, climate change and energy 
demand/supply; that regions strongly affected by three or more challenges are mainly 
situated in the South and on the coasts of Western and Central Europe; and that almost all 
regions will need to find locally-tailored solutions. Beyond these general conclusions on the 
2020 challenges and vague statements by the (former) Commissioner for Regional Policy 
that there is a disposition to devise policy tools in the period 2014-2020 in a way which 
                                                 
81 More detailed analysis was provided in four background documents covering the four challenges of 
demographic change (November 2008), globalisation (January 2009) climate change (March 2009) and 
the energy challenge (still to be published) 
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will address them in the most effective way,82 it remains to be seen what the implications 
are for the future proposals and design of Cohesion policy. 
3.1.2  Sixth Cohesion Progress Report  
A shorter term perspective on challenges was provided by the Sixth Interim Report on 
Economic and Social Cohesion published in June 2009.83 The Report updates the statistics 
on EU socio-economic trends and summarises the responses to the territorial cohesion 
consultation (see Section 2.5.5). The key messages on the current situation of EU regions 
are: 
x the continued existence of wide development disparities across the EU, particularly 
between regions in the EU15 and EU12 Member States - the ten highest ranked 
regions being located in EU15, often in capital regions, while GDP per head in some 
regions in Bulgaria and Romania remains below 30 percent of the EU27 average; 
x convergence in levels of GDP per head between less developed and developed 
regions over 2000-06, although little improvement in some cases (e.g. regions in 
Southern Italy and Portugal); 
x high disparities in unemployment, with 45 regions recording rates of more than 10 
percent in 2007 (mainly located in Belgium, Southern Italy, Poland and East 
Germany); and 
x some narrowing of unemployment disparities over the previous four years, with 
significant improvements seen in the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Southern Italy and 
Spain. 
Interestingly, the report provides a statistical analysis of creativity and innovation across 
the EU regions. This is justified on the basis of these themes having a distinct regional 
dimension and because their importance for regional development is argued to be stronger 
in the current context of the economic and financial crisis. The main findings of the 
analysis regarding creativity, defined as generating a new idea, are threefold. 
x Developing local talent: the share of graduates is nine percentage points higher in 
RCE regions than in Convergence regions; participation in lifelong learning is 
significantly lower in Convergence regions; and particularly low scores on the 
human capital intensity index (which combines secondary and tertiary education 
attainment) are found in regions in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Southern Spain.  
x Attracting talent and visitors: only eight EU regions match the US average of an 
eight percent share of foreign born graduates (way above the EU average of two 
                                                 
82 Hübner D (2009) Keynote speech at the debate How can EU cohesion policy help fight the global 
crisis?, Common House of Aquitaine, Emilia-Romagna, Hessen and Wielkopolska, 23 June 2009, 
Brussels 
83 European Commission (2009) Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council, Sixth progress report on economic and social cohesion COM(2009) 295 final, Brussels 
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percent); the share of working age population born in another country is four times 
higher in RCE regions (12.5 percent) than in Convergence regions (2.8 percent);  
and regions with a high number of hotel arrivals per head are mainly found in 
Western Europe. 
x Tolerance: based on a Eurobarometer survey, the EU is regarded as being relatively 
tolerant, although tolerance of neighbours and politicians of a different ethnic 
group, religion or sexual orientation is lower, and there has been a perceived rise in 
ethnicity-related discrimination in most countries.  
With respect to innovation, defined as putting a new idea into practice, the statistical 
analysis shows that: 
x Start-ups: only nine Member States met the EU objectives of making it easier 
simpler, cheaper and faster to register a new company by 2008; new foreign firms 
are often located in the capital region and over 2005-07 Convergence regions 
overtook RCE regions in terms of the number created per head.  
x Existing firms: R&D is highly concentrated sectorally and regionally: 30 percent of 
business expenditure on R&D is in only ten EU regions, and the share as a 
proportion of GDP is four times higher in RCE regions (1.3 percent) than in 
Convergence regions; and the number of patent applications is 13 times higher in 
RCE regions. 
The policy implications of this analysis are that Convergence regions should strive to embed 
foreign firms more strongly in their economies and improve educational attainment and 
participation in training; that phase-in/out (transition) regions should improve their 
business environment, invest more in R&D, education and training and the development of 
core creative skills; and that RCE regions should further integrate foreign residents into the 
labour market, make it easier for them to start businesses and increase investment in 
creativity and innovation. 
3.2 Lessons from evaluation: EU research on Cohesion policy 
Credible evidence and judgement about policy effectiveness and added value is of crucial 
importance for the debate on EU Cohesion policy reform. In the words of the recent EU 
Commissioner for Regional Policy, my objective is that our debates and discussions during 
the policy review are  as much as possible  based on evidence and not on anecdote or 
opinion.84 
EU-wide evaluation of the performance of Cohesion policy in the 2007-13 period is scant at 
this stage, notably because of the very low levels of expenditure during the first 18 months 
and the late start of the programmes. Moreover, over the last two years DG Regional 
Policys evaluation activity has been focused on the ex-post evaluation of the 2000-06 
                                                 
84 Hübner D (2009) Hearing on Results of the Ex Post Evaluation of Objectives 1 & 2, 2000-06, 23 June 
2009, Brussels. 
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period, which has received significantly more attention than in previous exercises. Some of 
the findings are already publicly available, but most will be published towards the end of 
2009 and in 2010.  
Plans by the Commission for thematic evaluations of the 2007-13 period are being 
developed throughout 2009. Several major studies are in the process of being commissioned 
and launched, including: policy analysis of the performance of Cohesion policy in 2007-13, 
with a particular focus on the theme of innovation; a study of the balance between sectoral 
and integrated approaches and the involvement of sub-national levels in innovation, 
transport and labour market policies; and a study on Cohesion policy and sustainable 
development. To learn from global experiences, a comparative study on EU Cohesion policy 
and third country and international economic development policies is being launched, and 
work is also underway with the OECD on place-based policies and with the World Bank on 
challenges for Europe and its neighbourhood. Lastly, in line with regulatory requirements, 
the Commission will publish its first strategic report in April 2010, synthesising the strategic 
reports of the Member States on the contribution of programmes towards the achievement 
of Cohesion policy objectives. 
Set against this context, the remainder of this section reviews the main findings of the 
available ex-post evaluations of the 2000-06 period, a study on the contribution of Cohesion 
policy to Lisbon and Gothenburg goals in the 2007-13 period, national assessments of the 
performance of Cohesion policy and some recent academic studies. 
The responsibility for ex-post evaluation of the 2000-06 programmes primarily lies with the 
Commission. It has adopted a different approach compared to previous periods with far 
more political priority attached to the exercise, an increased budget, much stronger quality 
management, and a more targeted and thematically oriented focus.  
The ex post evaluations of the Objectives 1 and 2 (ERDF) programmes - organised into 11 
inter-linked Working Packages  and the INTERREG and URBAN Community Initiatives are all 
due to be finalised by the end of 2009 (Box 1) . The Working Package on data availability, a 
precondition for some of the other studies, was completed in March 2008 and a further 
three have been finalised during the first quarter of 2009 (rural development, efficiency of 
major projects, gender and demography). The rest were scheduled to be finished between 
June and July 2009 (macro-economic modelling, transport, transport modelling, 
environment and climate change, and management and implementation) or the end of 2009 
(structural change, enterprise and innovation, coordination and synthesis, Interreg and 
Urban). Lastly, ex-post evaluations of the Cohesion Fund, ISPA and a sample of 1994-99 
projects will be launched in October 2009 and finalised in 2011.  
The final reports will be made available through the DG REGIO evaluation website and a 
synthesis of the ERDF reports is due to be published by the Commission in early 2010.85 At 
                                                 
85 See the evaluation section of DG Regional Policys website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/rado_en.htm 
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the time of writing only three final reports were available, the main findings of which are 
summarised here.  
 
 
3.2.1 Analysis of regional trends and Cohesion policy spending, 2000-06  
A starting point for the evaluation was to analyse trends in regional disparities across 
Objective 1 and 2 regions, partly as contextual analysis for other evaluation research.86 No 
attempt was made to model causality (that is, to measure the impact of Cohesion policy on 
regional growth) in this work package, although a key finding is that GDP growth was 
highest in the less developed EU regions.  
x The average GDP per head (in PPS) relative to the EU25 average in Objective 1 
regions increased by 4.1 percentage points over the 2000-05 period, most of which 
was accounted for by regions in the newer Member States (six percentage points 
increase compared to just 2.5 percentage points in the EU15). 
x High growth in the new Member States was concentrated in capital city regions and 
thus implied a widening of regional disparities within these countries, contrasting 
with a slight narrowing within EU15 Member States.  
x Breaking down GDP into its constituent components, the main driver of growth in 
the EU12 was productivity, while employment growth was more important in the 
EU15.  
                                                 
86 APPLICA, ISMERI and WIIW (2009) Work Package 1: Coordination, analysis and synthesis, Task 1b: 
Trends in regional economic development, European Commission, Brussels. 
Box 1: Ex-post evaluations of the 2000-2006 period 
Other evaluations   
1. Interreg Community Initiative  
2. Urban Community Initiative 
3. Cohesion Fund  
4. ISPA  
5. Sample of 1994-1999 projects 
 
Objectives 1 & 2 (ERDF) Work Packages 
1. Coordination and synthesis 
2. Data availability  
3. Macroeconomic Modelling  
4. Structural change  
5a. Transport Inception  
5b. Environment & climate change  
6. Enterprise and innovation  
7. Gender and demography  
8. Transport modelling   
9. Rural development  
10. Efficiency (major projects  unit costs) 
11. Management & implementation  
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With respect to Objective 2 regions, growth was lower than in Objective 1 regions but more 
than in non-assisted regions and generally highest in regions receiving most support in terms 
of share of population covered. Both productivity and employment increased at similar 
rates as in EU15 Objective 1 regions, contrasting with the experience in non-supported 
regions where productivity rose at around twice the rate of employment.  
A second area of evaluation interest is Structural Funds spending in 2000-06, based on 
financial allocations and implementation.87 With regard to the allocation of the Structural 
Funds and the different national strategies adopted, it was found that:  
x A regionally-based approach was prevalent in the EU15, contrasting with a national 
approach in the EU10. More specifically, 74 percent of EU15 programmes were 
regional, while the vast majority of programmes were sectoral in the EU10 (93 
percent). 
x Resources were highly concentrated with half of all funding allocated to 13 percent 
(or 33) of all programmes in seven countries, although slightly less concentration 
was found under Objective 2. 
x With regard to funding distribution and sources, domestic funding made up 37 
percent of the total budget in Objective 1 compared to 57 percent in Objective 2. 
ERDF contributed some 40 percent to the total (both Objectives), while the other 
EU Funds accounted for 23 percent of all funding (only 4 percent under Objective 2, 
although none in some countries). Private expenditure accounted for 38 percent of 
public funding (EU plus national) and was significantly higher in Objective 2 than 
Objective 1 regions (60 percent compared to 33 percent). 
x The highest levels of funding per head were in Greece (342 per head annually), 
Portugal (326 per head annually) and Spain (212 per head annually), Italy and 
Germany (166 per head in both), and - among the EU10 - in the three Baltic States 
(over 130 per head in each case) 
x In terms of the thematic allocation of funding, Objective 1 programmes focused 
more on basic infrastructure (40 percent), while Objective 2, especially in the 
EU15, attached more weight to the productive environment (57 percent), mainly on 
assisting SMEs. In Objective 1, however, some countries focused more on the 
productive environment (between 60 percent and 72 percent in Austria, Belgium, 
Sweden and Finland), while others were more geared towards basic infrastructure 
(Greece (52 percent), Ireland and Spain (46 percent in each) and Malta (60 
percent)), especially in the transport domain. Investment in human resources 
accounted for only one fifth of the total.  
The key findings regarding the relative importance of the scale and weight of the 
Structural Funds were that the Structural Funds amounted to just under 0.3 percent of 
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Financial implementation of Structural Funds, European Commission, Brussels. 
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EU15 GDP (although significantly more in Portugal (2.1 percent) and Greece (1.8 percent)) 
and 0.9 percent in the EU10 (highest in Latvia at 2.1 percent). As a proportion of total fixed 
investment, the share rises to 1.3 percent in the EU15 and 3.8 percent in the EU10, and 
significantly more in relation to government capital formation  - the ERDF alone accounts 
for 7.3 percent in the EU15 and 14.3 percent in the EU10, but as much as 42 percent in 
Portugal and 37 percent in  Greece. 
Examining the relationship between Structural Fund support and selected socioeconomic 
indicators which capture the potential need for support, it was found that: 
x the EU15 received relatively more funding than the EU10 in relation to levels of 
GDP per head;  
x there was a positive relationship between Structural Funds expenditure on RDTI and 
general expenditure on R&D in relation to GDP (but not in Belgium, Denmark and 
the Netherlands); and  
x an inverse relationship existed between the density of the motorway network in 
countries and the share of funds allocated to road building 
Lastly, with regard to financial implementation, the programmed funding shares were 
generally in line with how the resources were actually spent for the EU as a whole, 
although there were marked variations across types of expenditure, programmes and 
countries: in most countries, the share of expenditure on basic infrastructure was less than 
planned (especially in Spain, Greece, Portugal and France); there are a number of countries 
where the difference between actual and planned spending on productive environment 
Objective 1 programmes is large; and in Objective 2, spending was significantly less than 
planned on assisting SMEs in several countries. Nonetheless, there were limited problems 
in spending the allocated funding, even in new Member States, and automatic 
decommitment was relatively low, although there were problems in five specific 
programmes where decommitment levels were in the order of 10 percent of programme 
funding.  
3.2.2 Management and implementation of Cohesion policy, 2000-06 
One of the major foci of the ex post evaluation has been on the management and 
implementation of Cohesion policy in the 2000-06 period across the EU25. This aspect of 
the evaluation investigated four key issues:88 the characteristics of management and 
implementation systems and their particularities in each of the 25 Member States; the 
effectiveness and durability of management and implementation systems in the EU10, and 
the type, scale and sustainability of spillover effects on the overall institutional and 
                                                 
88 EPRC and Metis (2009) The Management and Implementation of Cohesion Policy, 2000-06, Final 
Synthesis Report to the European Commission (DG REGIO), European Policies Research Centre, 
University of Strathclyde, Glasgow. For a summary and reflection over some of the key issues to 
emerge, see: Bachtler J (2009) Can differentiated requirements for different Member States be 
defended? Hearing on the First Findings of the Ex Post Evaluation of Objectives 1 and 2, 23 June 2009, 
European Commission, Brussels. 
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administrative culture in these countries; the spillovers (added value) onto national policies 
in the EU15; and the integration of sustainable development in Cohesion policy 
programmes. The main conclusions of the evaluation were as follows: 
x The management and implementation of Cohesion policy in 2000-06 differed greatly 
across Member States, influenced not just by country-specific constitutional and 
institutional factors but also by the scale of EU funding, the relationship with 
domestic development policies and resource allocation systems. A common feature 
of the 2000-06 period, however, was that the implementation of Cohesion policy 
was demanding for many Member States.  
x Implementation performance was most striking in the new Member States (EU10), 
which administered ERDF largely in line with the Regulations in their first 
programme period. Despite this positive progress, the research identified some 
important constraints on effectiveness, in particular related to a strong 
compliance orientation of administrative procedures. Some of these constraints 
were addressed during the period in response to experience, but others remained 
outstanding and, if unresolved, will negatively affect implementation of the much 
larger amounts of EU funding during the 2007-13 period. 
x The future success of Cohesion policy implementation in the EU10 will largely 
depend on the completion of broader public administration reforms and on the 
achievement of a more stable political and institutional setting. 
x The 2000-06 period saw significant changes to the strategic management of the 
Funds in many EU15 Member States, particularly in terms of better-quality strategic 
planning, partnership and evaluation. The period was also characterised by an 
increasing pre-occupation with financial absorption and audit. While strengthening 
financial discipline and stimulating expenditure, there is evidence that this 
emphasis on financial management and audit had negative implications for the 
effective strategic delivery of programmes. 
x There is clear evidence of Cohesion policy having spillover effects on the domestic 
management and implementation systems of Member States. There are important 
examples of substantial direct and indirect impacts in the EU10. Cohesion policy 
also had a significant influence on the development of management and 
implementation systems of EU15 Member States during the 2000-06 period. 
x Interpretations of sustainable development (SD) varied during the 2000-06 period. 
Reflecting debates over the previous two decades, a diverse range of 
interpretations and refinements was used in the different contexts of legislation, 
regulation, policy and action, and practical evaluation increasingly accommodated 
procedural as well as substantive concerns.  
x Differentiated progress was made in accommodating the new concept of 
sustainable development within Cohesion policy during 2000-06. In particular, there 
was a general increase in SD awareness and understanding, and good practice 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 74  European Policies Research Centre 28
Challenges, Consultations and Concepts: Preparing for the Cohesion Policy Debate 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 74  European Policies Research Centre 29
examples illustrate different approaches to SD integration, mostly associated with 
individual elements of management and implementation systems. 
x Although individual initiatives recorded achievements, considerable difficulties 
were experienced by programme management bodies and partnerships with the 
concept of SD. In practice, the degree of operationalisation of 
awareness/understanding was limited, and the management and implementation 
systems restricted the scope and effectiveness of the integration. Systemic 
modification would be required for Cohesion policy programmes to be capable of 
fully addressing sustainable development. 
3.2.3 Evaluation of demography and gender in Cohesion policy, 2000-06 
Although demographic change was not among the EU priorities for Cohesion policy in the 
2000-06 period, the increasing attention being attached to the topic led the Commission to 
include it within its list of evaluation themes with a view to assessing the extent to which 
the ERDF was supporting adaptation to demographic change and to better understand the 
contribution that the ERDF could make in the future.89 
The evaluation found that demographic challenges were often taken account of in the 
socio-economic analysis of OPs, but far less so in terms of implementation and evaluation. 
Nonetheless, all programmes implemented measures which directly and/or indirectly 
address demographic challenges, notably in the fields of social infrastructure, transport and 
ICT infrastructure and urban/rural regeneration. While little or no quantitative evidence on 
impacts was found, qualitative evidence was reported to show that:  
x women, the elderly and migrants are usually the main beneficiaries of these 
measures, even if often little attention has been paid to their specific needs in the 
intervention design and in defining the accessibility conditions;  
x integrated urban/rural regeneration programmes appear to have contributed to the 
improvement of the attractiveness of some areas, which could mitigate migration 
problems;  
x transport and ICT interventions have been a good pre-condition for improving 
access to services and employment, especially in remote and scarcely populated 
areas and in regions characterised by high internal disparities;  
x social infrastructures appear to have contributed to restoring the attractiveness of 
isolated and/or degraded urban areas;  
                                                 
89 A final report was not available at the time of writing. These findings are drawn from a 
presentation by one of the evaluators and relate only to the demography component of the package: 
Manuela Samek Lodovici (2009) Hearing on the First Findings of the Ex Post Evaluation of Objectives 1 
and 2, 23 June 2009, European Commission, Brussels. 
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x SMEs, NGOs and municipal authorities have been relevant players in local 
development programmes, but often with little awareness of demographic issues 
and usually able to implement only very small projects 
In terms of strategic alignment, ERDF interventions had high synergies with ESF measures 
supporting training and counselling services and the EQUAL projects aimed at the social 
inclusion of the elderly, migrants and women. EAGGF measures (Leader +) supporting rural 
development also presented synergies with ERDF measures on local infrastructures and 
services for depopulated areas. In some regions, the ERDF interventions were part of wider 
regional and local development strategies, complementing national and regional measures 
and increasing their sustainability in the long run. 
Strong interactions were also found between support for demographic change and gender 
equality, as interventions in social infrastructures and in re-qualification projects in areas 
experiencing depopulation or deprived urban areas were indirectly beneficial for womens 
employment and their work-life balance. 
With respect to the main lessons learned, the evaluators argue that the implemented 
measures were more successful where a number of conditions were satisfied: better focus 
on demographic priorities; the integration of ERDF interventions within other locally-
implemented programmes; and where there effective public-private partnerships and 
governance capacity at local and regional level was created. In line with these findings, it 
was recommended that a place-based approach is required to address demographic 
challenges, implemented in an integrated and multilevel manner; interventions should be 
integrated into broader strategies which clearly address demographic priorities and exploit 
possible synergies with national or EU funded programmes implemented at regional/local 
level; measures should be targeted at the specific needs of local areas and population 
groups; and governance capacities at local level should be strengthened. 
The main policy recommendations were to include ageing and migration among the core 
priorities for ERDF intervention; to promote the adoption of a more pro-active and 
integrated approach; to support management and implementation capacity at the local 
level (e.g. through technical assistance and capacity building interventions); to promote 
innovation and exchange of experiences for institutional learning; and to develop and 
improve monitoring and evaluation as a tool to foster learning (e.g. through the issuing of 
guidance, the development of demographic indicators etc.).  
3.2.4 Evaluations of the 2007-13 period 
The Commission is currently in the process of launching studies to assess the performance 
of policy in the 2007-13 period and to provide lessons for the future. At this stage, 
however, the only completed studies are of an ex-ante nature, based on modelling 
techniques or documentary analysis of programme documents. For instance, a cross-
national macro-economic impact assessment was recently published, employing the so-
called HERMIN econometric model that has been developed specifically for Cohesion 
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policy.90 Based on a series of assumptions, model parameters and actual programmed 
financial allocations, the main estimated impacts on the EU12, Spain, Portugal and Greece 
by the end of the 2007-13 period are:91 increases in average GDP ranging from one percent 
in Spain to around 3-4 percent in Poland, Slovakia and Romania and to more than five 
percent in the Baltic States; and the creation of 1.9 million additional jobs across the EU.  
The other Europe-wide study to have been completed to date on the 2007-13 period is on 
the contribution of Structural Funds to the Lisbon and Gothenburg agendas.92 This 
assessment was undertaken early in the new period on the basis of strategy document 
analysis (including EU27 NSRFs, more than half of all Operational Programmes (ERDF and 
CF), a sample of ex-ante evaluations, National Reform Programmes and National 
Sustainable Development Strategies (NSDS)) rather than actual programme implementation 
experience.   
The key conclusion of the study is that Cohesion policy programmes have significant 
potential to contribute to the Lisbon and Gothenburg objectives, mainly regarding the 
themes of innovation, entrepreneurship, R&TD, transport infrastructure and synergies 
between environmental protection and growth, but less so in terms of the information 
society and energy dependence. This potential varies across countries depending on their 
size, economic potential, political priorities, the scale of funding and the strategies 
pursued, of which six different types are identified depending on the type of programme.  
x In competitiveness programmes, the focus is primarily on R&TD and innovation 
(with limited environmental priority) (IE, DK, LU, part of NL); on employment, 
urban regeneration and energy (as well as R&TD and innovation) (BE, part of NL, 
SE, FI, partly AT, DE); or on renewable energy, urban and rural development and 
tourism (as well as R&TD and innovation) (UK, FR, IT, ES, partly AT and DE).  
x The contribution to Lisbon and Gothenburg in Convergence programmes is mainly 
reflected through measures for transport and accessibility (EL, PT, HU, CZ, SL, MT, 
CY), knowledge promotion and accessibility (EE, LV, LT) and urban/rural 
infrastructure (PL, RO, BG, SK).   
In terms of strategic coherence, there was found to be close alignment between the NSRFs 
and NRPs (albeit less so with the NSDS), between OPs and the Community Strategic 
Guidelines (CSG) and between strategic objectives and financial allocations.  
The use of core indicators was found to be mixed and sometimes applied inconsistently, 
although they were often focused on Lisbon themes. However, different units of 
                                                 
90 Gáková Z, Grigonytǣ D and Monfort P (2009) A Cross-Country Impact Assessment of EU Cohesion 
Policy Applying the Cohesion System of HERMIN Models, Working Papers, No1/09, DG Regional Policy, 
European Commission, Brussels 
91 Funding allocations from 2000/04-2006 are accounted for.  
92 Nordregio (2009) The potential for Regional Policy Instruments (2007-13) to contribute to the 
Lisbon and Gotenborg objectives for Growth, Jobs and Sustainable Development, Final Report to the 
European Commission, Directorate-General for Regional Policy, Brussels. 
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measurement and methods have been used for some of the themes preventing comparison 
across countries and aggregation of core indicators to EU level. Indicators relating to 
sustainable development and Gothenburg were employed less frequently. Similarly, 
sustainable development related concepts (such as a three-pillar definition, the polluter 
pays principle, environmental/growth trade-offs) were only used in a minority of 
programmes and growth and jobs objectives tended to take precedence over social and 
environmental goals. Territorial cohesion, by contrast, was explicitly treated in two thirds 
of programmes, but at a general level, e.g. in terms of the reduction of regional spatial 
disparities or as an objective in exploiting regional potential (Convergence programmes), or 
in relation to inter-regional/national cooperation (Competitiveness programmes). 
A key recommendation of the study is that the links between Lisbon and Gothenburg should 
be strengthened within the framework of Cohesion policy through an increased focus on the 
pursuit of synergies in policy priorities and interventions, such as a better exploitation of 
physical inputs, boosting research and innovation in technologies and approaches to energy 
generation and conservation, improving the quantity and quality of the workforce, and 
conserving and enhancing the environment.   
3.3 Lessons from evaluation: National research 
National assessments of the performance of Cohesion policy in the 2007-13 period will 
become increasingly available by the end of 2009 as the Member States submit their 
strategic reports on the achievement of policy objectives to the Commission and progress 
their own plans for ongoing evaluation. In the context of a more flexible and needs based 
regulatory framework for evaluation in the 2007-13 period, most Member States and regions 
had finalised their evaluation plans by the start of 2009, setting out a wide range of 
thematic and process-related evaluations for the coming years, but few have been 
completed at this early stage in the programme period.93 However, some countries have 
been investing in their own evaluation research, either retrospectively with a view to 
assessing the performance of the Funds or with a future-oriented agenda related to the 
reform debate. Three examples are Austria, Germany and Poland. 
In Austria,  a recent ÖROK study on Cohesion policy in Austria over the 1995-2007 period94 
aimed to assess the effects of Structural Funds support since accession in 1995. The main 
findings are as follows.  
x Quantitative effects. Building upon research carried out by the Austrian Institute 
for Economic Research WIFO95, which analysed regional economic development 
since EU accession at district-level (Bezirke, below NUTS 3-level), it is noted that 
                                                 
93 Mendez C and Kah S (2009) Programme Implementation in Times of Economic Crisis: Review of 
Programme Implementation Winter 2008-Spring 2009, IQ-Net Review Paper, 24(1), Glasgow. 
94 ÖROK (2009) EU-Kohäsionspolitik in Österreich 1995-2007  Eine Bilanz. Materialienband, ÖROK-
Schriftenreihe 180, Wien 
95 Austrian Institute for Economic Research WIFO, EU-Regionalpolitik trägt zum regionalen Ausgleich 
bei, press release 15.07.2009, available at: 
http://www.wifo.ac.at/wwa/servlet/wwa.upload.DownloadServlet/bdoc/P_2009_07_15$.PDF 
(accessed 22.07.2009). 
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employment growth was 0.75 percent higher in regions assisted by ERDF funds 
compared to those without support, although no significant advances were made in 
productivity; employing state-level models to simulate the economic effects of 
regional subsidies, it is estimated that Cohesion policy had a statistically firm, 
though marginal, positive economic effect.  
x Institutional effects. The report attributes to Cohesion policy benefits associated 
with the creation of regional-level economic development structures and 
institutions which have helped the regions catch-up with national/international 
developments and access EU funding streams; in addition, the successful 
integration of Structural Funds implementation structures and procedures within 
the domestic system is considered to have led to increased professionalization 
(especially in terms of policy coordination) and the creation of structured 
opportunities for learning through monitoring and evaluation (especially under the 
ESF, where there have been spillovers into domestic labour market policies).  
x Policy focus. A much stronger regional orientation to Austrian development policies 
is a key positive impact, as is the shift towards economic and innovation type 
measures which were of less significance in the past. The other main areas of policy 
innovation attributed to Cohesion policy are territorial cooperation programmes, 
certain ESF labour market policy measures (e.g. preventative labour market policy, 
social inclusion etc.) and an increased market orientation in agricultural policy. 
From a more negative perspective, the report criticises the excessive 
administration, especially in terms of financial control, which is seen as detracting 
from policy experimentation, risk-taking and from discussing strategic content.  
A more forward-looking study has been conducted on behalf of the Federal German Ministry 
of Economics and Technology, considering options for the future of Cohesion policy post-
2013.96 With a review of the conceptual and historical basis for Cohesion policy, the report 
assesses the effectiveness of Structural and Cohesion Funds, confirming the mixed 
conclusions of other evaluation research. Based on its own econometric analysis, the report 
found that: 
x EU funding has not led to rise in public investment, at least in the Cohesion 
countries, and EU-supported expenditures appears to have substituted for other 
public spending (leading the authors to question why the additionality principle is 
not applied to the Cohesion Fund); 
x among unintended effects, there are strong indications that recipient countries 
have used Cohesion policy funds to reduce their budget deficits rather than 
financing (for example) reductions in corporate taxation; and 
                                                 
96 Zukunft der EU-Strukturpolitik, Schlussbericht Forschungsprojekt I D 4 - 15/07 im Auftrag des 
Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Technologie, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung 
GmbH, Mannheim, February 2009. 
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x there is only limited evidence for a demonstrable employment effect of Structural 
Funds spending. 
The study also considered a series of options and issues for Cohesion policy reform, based 
on different scenarios. Its preferred reform model would be for the Convergence 
objective to be based on two pillars: the first would apply to Member States with GNI per 
head of less than X percent with a minimum allocation of the funding being earmarked for 
the regions; the second pillar would apply to Member States with GNI exceeding X percent, 
with eligibility for regions with an average GDP per head of under Y percent (which may or 
may not be the current threshold of 75 percent). Different options are also put forward for 
the Regional Competitiveness and Employment objective: retention, abolition, or 
continuation without pre-set national allocations or with a reduced EU co-financing rate. 
The Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology has also funded two other studies on the 
impact of the Structural Funds in Germany since 2000, which will also examine the likely 
effects in 2007-13 and the potential effects post-2013. The first will be a macroeconomic 
impact assessment covering the German Convergence regions, employing the HERMIN model 
and focusing on issues relating to the level of funding; and the second, based on case 
studies, will cover the German RCE regions and examine whether there is a need for 
funding at all in these regions. Both studies are expected be finished by the end of 2009, 
and published in spring 2010 in the context of the debates linked to the Fifth Cohesion 
Report.  
Finally, Poland is one of the Member States investing heavily in evaluation, with a planned 
series of 14 thematic, horizontal, sectoral and territorial ex post evaluation studies. Two 
have already been completed. The first of these was on the impact of Cohesion policy in 
Poland 2004-06 on the EU15 economies, distinguishing between direct and indirect 
benefits.97 Direct benefits related to the direct participation of firms in projects co-
financed by Cohesion policy in Poland; under this heading, the effects were limited, with 
EU15 enterprises receiving only five percent of the available funding in the 2004-08 period 
(for example, only eight percent of the companies involved in Cohesion policy funded 
construction of road infrastructure came from outside of Poland). However, the economic 
growth stimulated by Cohesion policy in Poland had a much more significant indirect impact 
through the rising levels of goods imported from EU15 producers. The import of goods and 
services used in production processes in Poland, imports for consumption and imports in the 
form of investment were all boosted by the growth in demand triggered by the contribution 
of Cohesion policy to the modernisation of the Polish economy. According to the research, 
direct and indirect benefits in the EU from Cohesion policy interventions in Poland in the 
2004-08 period amounted to 3.2 billion (in 2008 prices), the main beneficiaries being 
Germany and Austria. This represented 19.5 percent of the total Cohesion policy resources 
flowing to Poland in that period. With the significantly increased funding available in the 
2007-13 period, the evaluation forecast that by 2004-15, the EU15 will have profited by 
around 24.9 billion from Cohesion policy spending in Poland. 
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The second evaluation employed macro-economic modelling to assess the impact of 
Cohesion policy on the Polish economy.98 Using the General Equilibrium Model, the study 
concluded that the contribution of Cohesion policy to national GDP had reached a maximum 
of 0.5 percent in 2008 and that an extra 100,000 jobs had been created. Moreover, the 
research found that Cohesion policy had exerted some (limited) influence in the very 
gradual slowing down of processes of regional economic divergence.  
3.4 Broader perspectives on the effectiveness of Cohesion policy 
Turning to the academic literature on the effectiveness of Cohesion policy, the extensive 
research (much of which involves macro-economic modelling or econometric analysis) has 
recently been reviewed in several studies.99 In general, the evidence for impact remains 
contested, given the wide range of (positive and negative) model-dependent estimates. The 
main reasons for this inconclusiveness are attributed to the complexity of the growth 
process itself, the failure to model it over time and over different countries and regions, a 
failure to isolate the effects on the target population (often at sub-regional level) or to 
separate out the impact of external factors. Similar conclusions can be drawn from several 
further studies published over the past year employing various econometric techniques.  
x Analysis of the effects of Cohesion policy on labour productivity over the 1975-
1988, 1989-1993 and 1994-1999 periods (using econometric modelling techniques) 
indicates a positive, but concave, effect on productivity growth.100 Considering 
each period in turn and the different funding objectives, it was found that impacts 
were only significant in the second and third periods and only Objective 1 and 
Cohesion Funds had a significantly positive impact, while funds devoted to 
Objectives 2, 3, 4 and 5 had a non-significant or negative effect.  
x Research on the impact of EU Cohesion policy on regional growth in Greece over 
the 19902005 period (analysed through the estimation of beta-convergence 
equations using panel methods of estimation) shows a positive impact on regional 
growth and convergence and that spatial income and unemployment spillovers have 
a significant influence on regional growth.101 
x Analysis of the GDP growth effects of the Structural Funds using a panel dataset of 
124 NUTS-1/2 regions over 1995-2005 does not indicate clear cut impacts for the 
total sum of Objectives 1, 2 and 3. However, Objective 1 payments are found to 
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unijnych na gospodarkē Polski w latach 2004-2020, Warsaw 2008. 
99 For instance, see section 2.3.1 of the Barca Report and Philippe Montfort (2009) Regional 
Convergence, Growth and Interpersonal Inequalities across EU, Working Paper for Barca Report, 
Directorate General Regional Policy, European Commission, Brussels 
100 Fiaschi D, Lavezzi A.M and Parenti A (2009) Productivity Convergence across European Regions: the 
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have a positive and significant impact on growth, but which occurs with a time lag 
of up to four years.102 
x An indirect estimation approach to testing the impact of Cohesion policy examines 
whether the additionality principle (which aims to ensure that EU expenditure is 
additional to domestic spending) is complied with.103 The empirical results indicate 
that Cohesion policy does effectively increases the economic development 
expenditure of the Member States (and that crowding out of domestic funding only 
occurs with relatively large inflows). Following the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the impact of general public spending on growth, the authors argue 
that this additional investment should therefore (indirectly) imply that Cohesion 
policy is indeed effective in promoting economic growth.  
A broader perspective on the effectiveness of Cohesion policy can be derived from some of 
the preparatory work on the EU budget review, two of which are of relevance to Cohesion 
policy.  
The main goal of the Study on EU Spending was to make proposals on the main areas of EU 
policy in which the budget should be concentrated in the future on the basis of an 
assessment of the current spending characteristics and bottlenecks.104 In the area of 
Cohesion policy, the report provides a short overview of the policys history and examines 
the case for an EU role across the different policy objectives. The starting point for the 
assessment is the characterisation of Cohesion policy as a redistributive (equity-based) 
policy, but with allocative (efficiency) objectives that has emerged and developed in 
response to other EU policy developments (the internal market and EMU). Looking at 
specific objectives, Convergence funding is justified on various grounds: complementarities 
between EU policies; second-best issues and solidarity between Member States; 
redistribution; preventing emigration from low-income regions; better income distribution 
and stabilisation, although not a justification in itself, is relevant especially where scale 
economies and externalities are generated with respect to financial and institutional 
capacity (i.e in poorer Member States). The territorial cooperation objective is also seen as 
being justified on the basis of economies of scale, spillover effects and common market 
complementarity arguments.  
By contrast, justification for the Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective is 
assessed as being weak, as the resources largely flow to relatively rich Member States 
which have the financial and institutional capacity to fund and deliver their own regional 
development policies, nor can any discernible impact on competitiveness and employment 
be expected. Although there are arguments to support EU budgetary intervention for 
Internal Market policies and the Lisbon agenda, this need not be done through a regional 
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policy framework. Based on this assessment, the report concludes that the financial 
allocations to the Regional Competitiveness and Employment heading should be reduced, 
and the present level of funding allocated to the Convergence and Territorial Cooperation 
Objectives should be maintained, but no funding increases or other changes are proposed to 
the latter two objectives.  
The second study of relevance to Cohesion policy is a meta-study on lessons from existing 
evaluations.105 The two main questions addressed in the report were (i) how relevant, 
effective, efficient and sustainable were EU programmes and policies in 2000-06 and (ii) 
what lessons learned are relevant to the review of EU spending? The first question was 
assessed through seven evaluation criteria on the basis of a review of 257 EU-commissioned 
evaluation reports covering all EU policy areas. Although a quarter of these reports 
concerned Cohesion policy instruments (mainly the ERDF and ESF), it is noted that the 
analysis of Cohesion policy evaluations is largely based on the Commissions own synthesis 
work of mid-term and ex-post evaluations of programmes and related Court of Auditor 
Reports. The main findings regarding Cohesion policy are as follows. 
x ERDF programmes are assessed as being relevant, although it was noted that a 
number of evaluators called for a stronger emphasis on other development 
objectives, notably sustainable development and, to a lesser extent, the Lisbon 
objectives in Objective 1 regions. Regarding effectiveness, the rapid economic 
growth witnessed in some Member States and regions over the 2000-06 period 
cannot be attributed exclusively to Cohesion policy as macro-economic studies, 
which are in any case considered to have a weak evidence base, predicted a 
relatively low economic impact (of some one to three percent of GDP). Lastly, 
regarding implementation systems, partnership and financial leverage effects are 
regarded positively, but administrative challenges are noted with respect to 
monitoring, financial management and coordination with the ESF. 
x ESF programmes are assessed as relevant, but with some caveats, such as an 
insufficient emphasis on social inclusion and on the gender pay gap in Objective 2 
areas. Effectiveness is assessed positively in terms of the contribution to the 
development of skills and qualifications, as well as in terms of system-wide effects 
such as reform of labour market policies. The efficiency and sustainability of the 
ESF is rated as mixed, although an explanation of the reasons for this rating is not 
given. 
x The Cohesion Fund is assessed as relevant and effective. The (single) evaluation 
reviewed is reported to present clear evidence of considerably faster improvement 
of infrastructure in the beneficiary Member States due to EU assistance. On the 
basis of macro-economic modelling, further impacts on business investments, 
economic activities, and employment are predicted to be positive, although 
concerns are expressed about sustainability in the absence of EU funds. 
                                                 
105 Euréval and Rambøll-Management (2008) Meta-study on lessons from existing evaluations as an 
input to the Review of EU spending, Final Report to DG Budget, European Commission, Brussels 
Challenges, Consultations and Concepts: Preparing for the Cohesion Policy Debate 
With regard to the second question addressed in the report, the main lessons learnt of 
relevance to Cohesion policy are: 
x policy design: a greater effort should be made to integrate cross-cutting themes to 
avoid missed synergies (e.g. gender mainstreaming), to formulate achievable 
strategies with clear objectives and intervention logics, and to consider exit 
strategies for post-funding periods; 
x subsidiarity: trans-national learning and thinking is an important source of added 
value; policy effectiveness requires interventions to target a critical mass; and the 
beneficial experiences of securing local relevance should be reinforced; 
x spending wisely: there is a need to avoid deadweight, to increase the leverage of 
funding (e.g. through financial engineering schemes) and to secure the benefits of 
co-finance and multi-annual budgeting  (although care should be taken to avoid 
negative consequences for transparency and prioritisation); and 
x seeking results: negative experiences with the performance reserve were due to a 
lack of a priori agreement over targets and the failure to resolve systemic burdens 
of excessive administration; and more should be done to learn from achievements 
(i.e. by using monitoring systems as a management tool).  
The wider perspective was also elicited at a Bureau of Economic Policy Advisers workshop 
organised on 29 January 2009 to assess the geography of regional development in Europe: 
what cohesion policies can and cannot do. The reference points (see Box 2) posed 
fundamental questions about the rationale, objectives, instruments and impacts of 
Cohesion policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 2: BEPA workshop on Cohesion policy: points of reference 
x Is unconditional convergence in per capita income across European regions a 
feasible/sensible policy objective? Are there other/better measures of disparity or cohesion? 
More generally, how can/should the overall objective of EU cohesion policies be made more 
operational?  
x Beyond the traditional supply side factors of economic growth, do cohesion policies of the EU 
sufficiently account for other conditioning elements of regional growth, in particular public 
and private institutions/governance? In addition, do cohesion policies sufficiently account for 
forces of agglomeration?  
x Do EU cohesion policies have the leverage to shape public and private 
institutions/governance at the national and regional level?  
x Which policy tools can be expected to have a bigger impact on cohesion across EU regions: 
Expenditure based measures? Regulatory measures? Labour/product market reforms? Building 
or improvement of institutions/governance?  
The main themes discussed, however, had a narrower focus, primarily on the relationship 
between regional development and institutions or migration, and on the rationale for and 
desirability of spatially-targeted policies.  
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x Research on the role of migration in regional development suggests that internal 
labour mobility in Finland has fostered divergence in regional disparities by 
contributing to the production of localised externalities.106 Similarly, in a selection 
of EU countries it was found that international migration supported productivity 
increases at the local level by bringing in complementary skills and, as a result, 
contributed to divergence in development at the regional level. It is therefore 
inferred that policies that foster mobility can enhance local productivity but cannot 
drive regional convergence. 
x Analysis of the role of institutions for regional development highlights the 
increasing recognition given to the critical significance of institutions in the 
literature.107 This is regarded as being insufficiently addressed through EU Cohesion 
policy and, while institution-based strategies should be tailored to regional and 
local conditions, the EU could provide support through the provision of guidelines 
for different intervention types. 
x Drawing on the World Bank Report of 2009, a paper was presented by one of the 
reports authors reiterating its key conclusions and three inter-related policy 
implications for the EU, namely: the need for a reconsideration of the role of 
institution-based policies (which should be spatially-blind and universal) and 
infrastructure (or corrective) policies; for Cohesion policy to shift its focus 
towards the goal of international convergence, rather than inter-regional 
convergence; and for the EU to primarily support Member States in identifying 
effective and efficient sectoral priorities.108 On the other hand, the World Bank 
Report was also criticised for being conceptually and theoretically weak in its 
understanding of uneven spatial development from a geography perspective, 
empirically biased in terms of case selection and data, and, hence, problematic in 
term of policy recommendations.109   
3.5 Implications for the Cohesion policy debate 
The extensive set of evaluations, studies and workshops summarised deal with many 
different issues, but there are five main points that are particularly relevant for the 
Cohesion policy debate. 
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First, although the EU has made some progress in reducing differences between Member 
States, and between the least developed and developed regions, the process of 
convergence has been slow. The Lisbon goals are not being achieved, in particular with 
respect to improving the business environment for entrepreneurship, investment in 
research and innovation, and the development of human resources. It is also clear from the 
persistence of high unemployment in a significant number of regions (even before the start 
of the crisis) that obstacles to development have not yet been addressed. The longer term 
outlook presents further challenges for EU regions from the impact of globalisation, 
declining populations, changes in rainfall and temperature and vulnerability to energy 
security and environmental sustainability. 
Second, Cohesion policy is making a sizeable contribution to investment and capital 
formation, especially in Central, Eastern and Southern Europe. In the current period, the 
policy has a significant potential to contribute to the Lisbon and Gothenburg objectives, 
with a strong focus on innovation, entrepreneurship, R&TD, transport infrastructure and 
environmental protection. Key aspects of the management of programmes have been 
improving, notably in relation to strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation. On the 
other hand, the quality of Structural Funds intervention is potentially being undermined by 
insufficient attention to deficits of institutional capacity as well as the increasing 
proportion of administrative time required for financial management, control and audit. 
Third, conclusive evidence on the effectiveness of the funds is frustratingly elusive. In the 
absence of ex post evaluation results (not yet available for the 2000-06 period), recent 
academic research repeats the conclusions from previous research: modelling projections 
show significant impacts of Cohesion policy transfers on GDP growth, but econometric 
studies have produced mixed results. Positive impacts are mostly found for Objective 1 
interventions, but some are limited, country or region specific, restricted to particular 
indicators, and/or with considerable time-lags. The effects in Objective 2 regions are 
difficult to identify in evaluation research; while a range of programme, region and 
country-specific quantitative and institutional impacts have been found, these generally 
defy easy aggregation at EU level. 
Lastly, critical questions are being asked whether Cohesion policy should continue in its 
current form. In particular, the studies conducted in the framework of the budget review 
imply or explicitly advocate focusing EU funding on the Convergence objective with a 
rationalisation or discontinuation of support in regions in richer countries. 
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4. PREPARING FOR THE COHESION POLICY DEBATE:  
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
While much of the activity over the past year has been on evaluation and other analysis, 
some thinking has also been undertaken on what kind of specific changes are needed for 
the future of the policy. In general, these have eschewed issues of geographical eligibility 
and financial allocation, concentrating instead on the content and management of the 
policy. However, the changing maps of eligibility are encouraging thinking about new types 
of Cohesion policy objective. This section reviews the key issues being considered. 
4.1 Concepts and ideas for Cohesion policy reform 
Fundamental questions for the future of Cohesion policy were identified by DG REGIO at a 
brainstorming workshop involving senior DG REGIO officials and academics in February 
2009: Is the policy an allocative or distributive policy? Is the Lisbon agenda the right way to 
go? What is the best approach to foster institution building - more stringent conditionalities 
or by fostering learning?  Which regions should be targeted and where? 110 The debate 
highlighted the dilemmas of the policy. For example: the policy is difficult to categorise as 
either allocative or distributive  both types of logic/effect are evidently present. The 
Lisbon agenda is not necessarily appropriate in all places, as less developed regions face 
entry barriers to effective participation in this agenda; there is a danger of losing core 
objectives and principles, although it is open to debate whether competitiveness and 
cohesion are mutually exclusive or reinforcing; and multiple objectives create confusion 
and make it difficult for any single objective to be targeted effectively. The case for 
supporting lesser developed regions in richer Member States is weak, although legitimacy 
could be lost if the focus was on poorer Member States alone. 
Among the main lessons drawn from the discussion for the future, were three general policy 
recommendations: the need to adapt to new challenges, but interestingly singling out 
climate change as the main candidate; the need to be sensitive to both competitiveness 
and absorption capacity; and the need to avoid a one-size fits all approach. A final set of 
lessons concerned the link between the Lisbon agenda and regional development, namely 
for more thought to be given to how the knowledge economy translates into the creation of 
enterprise (e.g. through networks and mobility) and innovation; the importance of socio-
economic context; and that complementary policies matter (such as the relationship and 
division of tasks between Cohesion policy and EU innovation policies).    
Similar issues were also raised in contributions from academics to a conference on the 
future of Cohesion policy in March 2009 organised by the Czech EU presidency,111 although 
some different proposals for reform were also highlighted:112  
                                                 
110 Begg I (2009) The Future of Cohesion Policy, Briefing note based on The future of Cohesion policy: 
a brainstorming workshop, Brussels. 
111 Blaek J (2009) Evolution or Revolution? Some dilemmas for Future Cohesion Policy After 2013, 
paper prepared for the International Conference on the Future of Cohesion Policy and integrated 
Local Development, 26-27 March 2009, Prague; Santos I (2009) EU Cohesion Policy: Some 
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x flexible concentration: greater Member State flexibility in the choice of thematic 
priorities, as long as they are limited and financially concentrated; 
x phasing-out support or co-funding: the impact of losing Convergence funding 
eligibility could be eased through a new phasing-out category or by gradually 
increasing the domestic co-funding component as the 75 percent threshold is 
approached; 
x links to Lisbon: linking Cohesion policy more closely to the Lisbon agenda by 
increasing the scope of eligibility under the Cohesion Fund to scientific and 
research infrastructure; and 
x administrative simplification: the need for radical simplification in implementation 
systems.  
Many of these and other proposals have also been examined in the Barca Report, which 
contains the most concrete and advanced thinking on policy reform to date. 
4.2 Developing ideas for change - the Barca Report 
The Barca Report was an initiative launched by Commissioner Danuta Hübner and the 
Director-General of DG REGIO in 2007. In the context of the budget review, the remit given 
to Dr Fabrizio Barca (Director-General of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance) was 
to undertake an independent re-assessment of the effectiveness of Cohesion policy to date 
as well as a series of proposals how to reform Cohesion policy for the period post-2013. The 
assessment was based on an extensive programme of research and a series of hearings and 
seminars with academic experts and policy-makers conducted during 2008-09 leading up to 
the publication of the Report in April 2009.113 The Report sought to set an agenda for 
reform and initiate a frank, informed and timely debate on the conceptual, political and 
operational aspects of the policy. It discusses the economic rationale and motivation of an 
EU place based development policy and provides an assessment of Cohesion policy. In 
addition it identifies a limited number of core priorities on which to focus Cohesion policy. 
Lastly, it presents recommendations on key pillars of Cohesion policy governance 
pinpointed for reform (see Box 3). 
The starting point for the Report is the relevance and suitability of the place-based 
development approach for Cohesion policy. An EU role policy role is justified on the basis 
that economic integration (notably through the Single Market) requires accompanying EU 
action to reduce persistent inefficiency (underutilisation of resources resulting in income 
below potential in both the short and long-run) and persistent social exclusion (primarily, 
an excessive number of people below a given standard in terms of income and other 
                                                                                                                                            
fundamental questions, paper prepared for the International Conference on the Future of Cohesion 
Policy and integrated Local Development, 26-27 March 2009, Prague. 
112 Blaek J (2009) ibid 
113 Barca F (2009) An Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion Policy: A place-based approach to meeting 
European Union challenges and expectations, Brussels. See also the background papers at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/future/barca_en.htm 
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features of well-being) in specific places. A place-based approach  whereby the EU sets a 
framework for regional development intervention and countries/regions are responsible for 
designing and implementing the intervention - is regarded as the only policy model that is 
compatible with the EUs hybrid form of government and limited democratic legitimacy 
(p. XII). The EU is also seen as being best suited for dealing with cross-border issues, as well 
as promoting processes of institutional learning and dissemination and exerting exogenous 
pressure to challenge vested interests.  
The Reports assessment of Cohesion policy to date is mixed. As other research has found, 
the empirical evidence on the performance of Cohesion policy did not allow conclusive 
answers to the drawn on the effectiveness of the policy. Despite the limitations, the Report 
concluded that the current architecture of Cohesion policy represents an appropriate basis 
for implementing the place-based development approach (notably the multi-level 
governance approach, the contribution to institution-building and partnership, and the 
scope for cooperation) but that the policy requires a comprehensive reform for it to meet 
the challenges facing the Union (p.XV). Deficiencies were identified with respect to 
strategic planning, a lack of focus on priorities, weaknesses in the use of indicators and 
targets, and a lack of political and policy debate on results. 
This assessment leads to the recommendation for future Cohesion policy to concentrate on 
a limited number of priorities. This concentration should allow a Europe-wide critical mass 
of interventions to be achieved, with greater possibilities of having tangible impacts, and 
which would receive more political attention and allow more focused management of 
interventions by policymakers, especially in the Commission. The Report identifies three 
criteria for the selection of these priorities: 
x EU-wide relevance - the  needs and expectations of European citizens and of the 
advantage of the EU over Member States in addressing the issue;  
x their place-based nature - the extent to which the inefficiency and/or social 
exclusion problems relevant for the issue are context dependent, requiring 
interventions to be  tailored to the characteristics and needs of different places; 
and  
x verifiability - the extent to which policy objectives can be clearly identified and 
measured. 
The other governance proposals, encapsulated in the ten pillars (Box 3) flow from this 
analysis, in particular a modified strategic relationship between the Commission and 
Member States which enables results to be verified and provides incentives for learning, 
evaluation and policy debate. A territorialised social agenda as part of Cohesion policy is 
also advocated, aimed at guaranteeing socially agreed standards for particular aspects of 
well-being to which people attach a high priority. The Report concludes with a plea for the 
negotiation on resources, governance and goals to be completed at the same time to ensure 
that the allocation of resources is subordinated to a common acceptance of the rules and 
goals for using them. 
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Box 3: Barca Report - ‘ten pillars for reforming Cohesion policy governance’ 
 
Pillar 1: An innovative concentration on core priorities and a conservative territorial 
allocation. The concentration of 55-65% of funding on 3-4 core priorities (the share 
varying by Member State and region), with the criteria for the territorial allocation of 
funding, and the distribution of funds between lagging and non-lagging Regions and for 
territorial cooperation remaining much as now. Six possible core priorities are 
innovation, climate change, migration, children, skills and ageing.  
 
Pillar 2: A new strategic framework for cohesion policy. An enhanced strategic dialogue 
between the Commission and Member States (Regions), based on a European Strategic 
Development Framework, setting out the major policy innovations clear-cut principles 
for the core priorities and a set of indicators for assessing performance. 
 
Pillar 3: A new contractual relationship, implementation and reporting aimed at results 
A new type of contractual agreement (a National Strategic Development Contract) 
between the Commission and Member States, focused on performance and on the 
institutional requirements for intervention, coupled with the preparation of an 
Implementation Assessment (where required) by the Commission and of a Strategic 
Report on Results by Member States annually after the third year.  
 
Pillar 4: A strengthened governance for the core priorities. The establishment of a set of 
ex-ante conditionalities on the institutional framework required to be in place in order 
to pursue each core priority and a system for assessing progress in meeting targets. 
 
Pillar 5: Promoting additional, innovative and flexible spending. The strengthening of 
the principle of additionality through linkage to the Stability and Growth Pact, plus a 
contractual commitment and an assessment of how the policy is delivering value 
added, and the option of implementing the de-commitment rule over the entire country. 
 
Pillar 6: Promoting experimentalism and mobilising local actors.  A better balance 
between incentivising local agents to risk and invest and preventing policy from being 
captured by local interest, by encouraging experimentalism, using a small fund for 
innovative territorial actions and using international expertise locally. 
 
Pillar 7: Promoting the learning process: a move towards prospective impact evaluation 
Encouraging the design and implementation of counterfactual methods for assessing the 
impact of policy interventions, to improve understanding of what works, especially in a 
prospective sense, so that evaluation is designed together with the intervention, 
focusing attention on objectives and on the criteria for the selection of beneficiaries.  
 
Pillar 8: Refocusing and strengthening the role of the Commission as a centre of 
competence. A significant investment in human resources and organisational changes in 
the Directorates-General of the Commission which have overall responsibility for 
cohesion policy, together with improved coordination. 
 
Pillar 9: Addressing financial management and control. Recent changes in this area, and 
further measures on the basis of current debate, should allow a greater efficiency to be 
achieved and allow additional investment in human resources.  
 
Pillar 10: Reinforcing the high-level political system of checks and balances. 
An improved high-level political debate, with new information on performance and a 
renewed system of checks and balances among the European institutions, should be 
strengthened by creating a formal Council for Cohesion policy.   
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A substantive discussion of the Report with Member States was held on 22 June 2009, 
providing a first opportunity for national policymakers to react to the Reports proposals.114 
Although Member States were cautious in reacting to a complex and wide-ranging 
document, there was some general agreement on the validity of the place-based concept 
and the justification for the role of Cohesion policy. The proposed spatial and thematic 
concentration of resources was supported in principle, and several of the recommendations 
were regarded as having merit (e.g. more flexibility on n+2, simplification of the 
additionality requirement, experimentalism, more strategic reporting, high-level political 
debate). 
On the other hand, there were many questions about the operationalisation of the 
proposals, notably with regard to the proposed strategic development framework, the 
outcome-focus of contracts, and the feasibility of impact evaluation. The prospect of 
Member State performance being assessed and ranked caused some disquiet, and there was 
concern that several issues had not been sufficiently developed e.g. the coordination of 
Funds, the justification for a territorialised social agenda, the resolution of financial 
management, control and audit problems, the scope for the EU to induce institutional 
changes, and the need for systemic reforms at Member State level. 
Other reaction has so far been sparse. The Barca Report has been presented at bilateral 
meetings with national policymakers in Italy, Poland and Portugal115, and also at some fora 
(Brussels regional offices, Notre Europe), with presentations to the Committee of the 
Regions and European Parliament foreseen for September/October 2009. However, the 
participants at these meetings have mainly sought clarification and interpretation, and 
there has been no formal response from any Member State. Some sub-national authorities 
have used the Report as a reference point to justify certain political positions  notably on 
the retention of a well-funded Cohesion policy providing support for all regions after 
2013.116   
Within the Commission, there are mixed views. For those tasked with the budget review, 
the Barca proposals suggest a much broader scope for Cohesion policy  going in the 
direction of a European development policy - that raises questions of political desirability 
and practical feasibility (within a limited EU budget). The thematic focus is regarded as 
potentially very broad, cutting across several different policy areas and DG responsibilities. 
The proposal to bring rural development into Cohesion policy runs counter to the view of 
                                                 
114 Bachtler J (2009) Seminar on the Barca Report: Summary note of the discussion, DG REGIO, 
European Commission, Brussels. See also workshop reports at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/future/seminars/barca_sem_220609_en.htm  
115 Other national meetings have been or are being scheduled in Austria and Spain. 
116 See for example: Statement by Michael Schneider, chairman of the COTER Commission on the 
Barca report, COER Meeting, Tabor, 5 May 2009. Letter from the Economics Ministers of the German 
(Western) Länder to the Federal Government, 27 August 2009. Barca report: a placed-based approach 
to meeting EU challenges, UK Local Government Association, June 2009. Stellungnahme des 
Staatsministeriums EU-Strukturpolitik für Baden-Württemberg in der nächsten Förderperiode, 
Landtag von Baden-Württemberg, 15.7.2009, 14/4837. 
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the Agriculture Commissioner who has argued strongly that rural development must remain 
within the CAP.117 
From the EoRPA fieldwork research among nine national governments, several unofficial 
points were made in reaction to the Barca Report. First, the Report was considered a 
difficult and complex document to read, with a dense mix of economic theory, empirical 
research and policy proposals. Notwithstanding this constraint, the Report was mostly 
regarded as providing a fresh and valuable contribution to the policy debate  what one 
commentator has referred to as a spring clean of the policy.118 
Second, the concept of a place-based approach was thought to be interesting and useful  
often reflecting the debates and recent policy directions in national regional policies over 
the past decade. Several proposals also mirror national thinking on the reform of Cohesion 
policy. However, the ambition of the concept  as presented in the Report  was 
questioned. Specifically, the state of institutional capacity at regional and local levels 
across the EU was thought to be insufficiently developed for effectively aggregating and 
representing local preferences in strategic planning. Further, the level of knowledge (and 
knowledge flows) required to enable higher levels of government (such as the Commission) 
to challenge the expenditure choices of lower levels, especially where vested interests 
were resistant to change, was thought to be highly problematic in terms of feasibility. 
Third, while the Report was considered to contain important proposals, several key 
recommendations were not considered to be politically realistic. This applied in particular 
to the proposed thematic concentration; in a policy environment with numerous actors with 
different priorities, it was thought (by some) to be unrealistic to focus Cohesion policy 
spending on narrowly defined priorities. Concerns about realism also applied to the 
proposed changes to the spatial coverage of the policy by introducing a transition 
category of eligibility, which was welcomed by some and opposed by others depending on 
their budgetary interests. It was notable that even those Member State officials who 
welcomed the proposal for a transition category were doubtful about the likelihood of it 
being agreed. A new Council configuration for Cohesion policy (or other high-level forum) 
was regarded as positive in practice, but most policy-makers questioned whether their 
ministers would be supportive of this idea, given the technical grasp of Cohesion policy that 
would be required. 
Fourth, the proposed core priorities drew a mixed reaction. Some Member State officials 
saw scope for such priorities to rejuvenate Cohesion policy, providing a justification for the 
pan-European approach of the policy. Others were unhappy with the proposed priorities 
especially in countries where, for example, support for dealing with migration or childhood 
                                                 
117 The Voice of the Mountains, Speech by Commissioner Marian Fischer Boel to the Forum 
Berglandwirtschaft, Brussels, 31.3.2009. The Future of Rural Development: The Role of the CAP and 
Cohesion Policy, IEEP CAP2020 Policy Briefing, No.5, May 2009, Institute for European Environmental 
Policy, London. 
118 The reader who perseveres  even if disagreeing with certain proposals, or finding that they 
remain too vague  cannot help but experience the satisfying feeling of a spring clean, p.5 in The 
Barca Report: A Spring Clean for Europes Cohesion Policy, Marjorie Jouen, Notre Europe, May 2009. 
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deprivation has not been supported through Structural Funds. Some of the priorities, such 
as climate change, were not considered to be a primary goal of regional policy. 
Lastly, there was a disappointment among some net payer countries that the Report had 
not been prepared to consider seriously the abolition of Cohesion policy support in the 
richer Member States or to consider other ways (or interpretations) of how the EUs 
cohesion goal might be achieved. The absence of any discussion of levels of funding was 
also criticised. 
4.3 Implications of changing maps 
At the heart of the reform debate on EU Cohesion policy is a complex set of budgetary 
issues concerning overall expenditure and the allocation of finance to countries and 
regions. At this stage in the debate, the overall amount of the budget and the share for 
Cohesion policy in that total is an unknown. It is also unclear just how much of an appetite 
there is for a fundamental reform of budgetary principles, or whether modest adjustments 
of the current mechanisms are more likely. However, it is clear that, unless steps are taken 
to disentangle decisions about revenue-raising from those about spending, the distribution 
of Cohesion policy resources will continue to be an important element in determining 
acceptable net balances. Moreover, eligibility for the Convergence priority  both the 
regional (formerly Objective 1) and the national element (i.e. the Cohesion Fund) has 
become entrenched in Commission policy. It is arguable that the so-called Berlin formula 
has also achieved this status, although the final negotiations of both the 2000-6 and 2007-
13 Financial Perspectives involved substantial tinkering with the methodology to achieve 
politically acceptable outcomes. 
The distribution of funding for the 2007-13 period was principally based on regional GDP 
data for 2000-2 and GNI data for 2001-3. Regional GDP data are now available for 2006. In 
addition, Eurostat has updated national GDP(PPS) data, including forecasts, for the period 
to 2009. This enables some rough forecasts of regional GDP(PPS) to be made for 2007-2009, 
the period which, in principle, would be used as the basis for Convergence eligibility in the 
post-2013 period. Of course, such forecasts must be treated with considerable caution. In 
particular, they presuppose that regional GDP growth rates will mirror national ones; this is 
a heroic assumption. Moreover, given current conditions, the data are likely not only to be 
volatile, but also subject to revision.  
Current convergence coverage involves 84 regions in 18 Member States and a total 
population of around 154 million, this being over 31 percent of the EU27 population. On the 
basis of forecast regional GDP data for 2007-9, this would fall significantly - to 68 regions119 
in 16 Member States and total of 120 million inhabitants, or about 24 percent of the EU 
population (see Table 1). These changes arise from a combination of regional economic 
change and the impact of Bulgaria and Romania on EU average GDP  i.e. the shift from 
EU25 to EU27, which entails a further statistical effect. 
                                                 
119 The number of eligible regions cannot be compared directly owing to boundary changes. 
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At the national level, the principal changes would be as follows within the old Member 
States: 
x Germany: would lose all convergence coverage, except Brandenburg-Nordost; 
x Greece: three regions (Ionia Nisia, Peloponnisos and Kriti) would lose eligibility, 
with coverage falling from 37 to 24 percent of the national population; 
x Italy: two regions (Molise and Balisicata) would gain Convergence status, taking 
coverage from 29 to just over 30 percent of the national population; 
x Spain: three regions (Andalucia, Castilla-La Mancha and Galicia) would lose 
eligibility; only Extremadura would retain it so that coverage would fall from 31 
percent to 2.4 percent of the population; 
x UK: West Wales & the Valleys; Cornwall & Scilly Isles would lose eligibility, so that 
the UK would have no Convergence regions. 
Importantly, however, changes are not limited to the EU15. The following regions would 
also lose Convergence status: 
x Czech Republic: Stĥedni ąechy  
x Malta  
x Poland: Mazowiecki (Warsaw region) 
x Romania: Bucarest-Ilfov  
x Slovenia: following the split into two NUTS 2 regions, Zahodna Slovenija (Ljubljana 
region) 
The situation would be unchanged in the remaining countries currently concerned by 
Convergence status, namely: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Portugal, 
Slovakia.  
A number of points arise from this. Convergence region coverage would become more 
heavily concentrated in the new Member States. In these countries the losses would be 
Bucharest, Mazowiecki, Malta and Zahodna Slovenija. These losses are significant. Leaving 
aside the case of Malta aside - a single region country - the areas concerned are the capital 
regions of the countries concerned, and their loss of eligibility raises serious questions 
about support for the key drivers of the economy.  
On the other hand, the changes are not large compared with those in the EU15 where 
Greece, Portugal and Italy would be the only countries with significant Convergence region 
coverage; the absence of significant interest from Spain and Germany would have 
important implications for lobbying. 
 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 74  European Policies Research Centre 48
Challenges, Consultations and Concepts: Preparing for the Cohesion Policy Debate 
Table 1: Current eligibility and future eligibility changes 
 
2007-13 Coverage (2000-2 GDP data) 
Future eligibility? 2007-9 
forecast GDP data 
 
Convergence Phasing-
out 
Phasing-in Convergence GDP <75% 
EU15 
average 
EU27 Pop (m) 153798.8 16594.5 19534.2 119661.7 32264.7 
EU27 Pop (%) 31.4 3.4 4.0 24.1 6.5 
EU27 no of 
regions 84 16 13 68 22 
Belgium   12.3   19.1 
Bulgaria  100.0   100.0  
Czech rep 88.6   77.1 11.4 
Germany  12.3 6.1  1.4 9.7 
Estonia  100.0   100.0  
Ireland    26.7   
Greece  36.5 55.7 7.8 23.6 25.2 
Spain  31.0 5.8 20.6 2.4 22.1 
France  2.9   2.9  
Italy  29.0 1.0 2.8 30.2 5.0 
Cyprus    100.0   
Latvia  100.0   100.0  
Lithuania  100.0   100.0  
Hungary  71.9  28.1 71.8  
Malta  100.0    100.0 
Austria   3.4   3.4 
Poland  100.0   86.5  
Portugal  67.6 3.9 2.3 67.5 4.0 
Romania  100.0   89.7  
Slovenia  100.0   53.9  
Slovakia  88.8   88.8  
Finland    12.8   
UK  4.0 0.6 4.4  7.0 
Source: Commission information from Inforegio and own calculations from Eurostat data. 
A number of points arise from this. Convergence region coverage would become more 
heavily concentrated in the new Member States. In these countries the losses would be 
Bucharest, Mazowiecki, Malta and Zahodna Slovenija. These losses are significant. Leaving 
aside the case of Malta aside - a single region country - the areas concerned are the capital 
regions of the countries concerned, and their loss of eligibility raises serious questions 
about support for the key drivers of the economy.  
On the other hand, the changes are not large compared with those in the EU15 where 
Greece, Portugal and Italy would be the only countries with significant Convergence region 
coverage; the absence of significant interest from Spain and Germany would have 
important implications for lobbying. 
European Policy Research Paper, No. 74  European Policies Research Centre 49
Challenges, Consultations and Concepts: Preparing for the Cohesion Policy Debate 
Although most of the new Member States would retain Convergence status, actual 
allocations would depend partly on growth rates since, for the current period, allocations 
to the new Member States were primarily driven by the constraints of capping, rather than 
regional disparities. It is here that the volatility of the current period may have significant 
effects on future allocations. Several of the new Member States, notably the Baltic 
countries, have been severely affected by the recession, with the potential consequence of 
lower Structural Fund receipts because of the impact of capping. 
The mixed pattern of economic growth coupled with loss of Convergence status in 
Germany, Spain and Greece, seems likely to fuel demands for generous transitional 
arrangements. This is all the more so since all of those regions which would lose 
Convergence status on the basis of the EU27 average for 2007-9  with the exception of the 
Bucharest, Ljubljana and Warsaw regions - would still be eligible for Convergence status if 
the EU15 average were used. In addition, most of the existing Phasing-out regions, some 
current Phasing-in regions and some areas that are currently not designated at all also have 
GDP per head below the EU15 75 percent threshold on the basis of these forecasts. All 
regions with GDP below the EU15 threshold are included as Phasing-out areas in Table 1. 
They include: 
x Belgium: Hainaut, Namur, Luxembourg 
x Czech Republic: Stĥedni ąechy 
x Germany: Mecklenburg-Vorpommern; Chemnitz, Sachsen-Anhalt; Thüringen 
x Greece: Kentriki Makedonia; Dytiki Makedonia; Peloponnisos 
x Spain: Castilla-La Mancha; Andalucia 
x Italy: Abruzzo; Sardegna 
x Malta 
x Austria: Burgenland 
x Portugal: Algarve 
x United Kingdom: Tees Valley; Lincolnshire; Cornwall & the Scilly Isles; West Wales 
& the Valleys.  
This raises the curious prospect of the capitals of Poland, Romania and Slovenia losing 
eligibility completely (except for Phasing-in, assuming the designations were the same), 
while some regions of richer Member States (Belgium, Italy, UK) gain or regain Phasing-out 
status.  
For the Cohesion Fund, based on data currently available, the position is relatively stable 
(see Table 2). Based on 2005-7 data, Greece would lose Cohesion Fund eligibility, and thus 
only Portugal among old Member States would retain it. Based on current growth 
trajectories in relation to EU27 average, Cyprus and Slovenia are also likely to cease to 
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qualify, although it is worth noting the precedent in Spanish eligibility under the current 
Financial Perspective. 
Table 2: GNI(PPS) per head (EU27=100) 
  2001-3 2002-4 2003-5 2004-6 2005-7 
CF 
2007-
13 
CF post 
2013? 
EU27 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0   
Belgium 126.4 125.1 123.2 122.0 121.9   
Bulgaria 31.3 33.2 34.4 35.6 36.8 Y Y 
Czech Rep 69.0 69.9 71.7 73.0 74.6 Y Y 
Denmark 126.3 126.3 126.6 128.0 128.2   
Germany 115.8 116.3 116.8 116.5 116.0   
Estonia 48.2 51.4 55.6 60.2 64.8 Y Y 
Ireland 116.5 119.3 121.7 123.4 124.9   
Greece 90.1 92.0 93.1 94.5 95.7 Y ? 
Spain 99.2 100.1 100.8 101.9 102.6 [Y]  
France 116.1 113.9 112.6 112.3 112.1   
Italy 113.4 109.6 107.3 105.0 103.4   
Cyprus 87.1 87.2 88.1 88.7 89.5 Y Y 
Latvia 41.4 43.3 46.0 48.9 52.7 Y Y 
Lithuania 44.4 47.2 50.0 52.4 55.2 Y Y 
Lux 199.3 203.6 210.4 223.7 226.8   
Hungary 58.4 59.6 60.2 60.2 60.2 Y Y 
Malta 79.5 78.4 76.1 74.6 74.5 Y Y 
Neths 134.3 133.5 132.4 132.9 133.5   
Austria 126.6 127.6 127.9 127.3 127.2   
Poland 48.1 48.5 49.0 49.7 50.9 Y Y 
Portugal 75.9 75.3 74.6 73.4 72.6 Y Y 
Romania 29.4 30.9 32.7 35.0 37.1 Y Y 
Slovenia 80.9 82.6 84.3 86.0 87.6 Y Y 
Slovakia 53.3 54.1 55.8 58.9 62.8 Y Y 
Finland 115.0 115.5 115.4 117.4 118.3   
Sweden 122.5 123.8 124.4 125.4 126.1   
UK 121.3 123.2 123.1 121.8 120.0   
Source: Own calculations from DG ECFIN data. 
Not surprisingly, the implications of the shifting maps of eligibility have prompted 
discussions on possible alterations to the algorithms for determining spatial coverage and 
financial allocations. Specifically, there has been debate about creating a transition or 
Convergence(b) objective for regions above 75 percent of EU GDP per head but below 80, 
90 or 100 percent. The main argument for such an approach is the need to lessen the big 
differences in per capita Cohesion policy support for regions either side of the 75 percent 
threshold, and to introduce some form of gradation in the provision of aid. A second 
justification is the desirability of ensuring continued strong EU15 interest in Cohesion policy 
after 2013. 
The desirability of ameliorating the boundary effect was voiced at the Prague 
International Conference under the Czech Presidency, where it was noted that the 
eligibility criteria need to be reconsidered, potentially with modulated Convergence 
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support for regions immediately above the 75% threshold120. As noted in Section 4.2 above, 
the Barca Report also made a proposal to create a category of transition regions. 
4.4 Emerging thinking in DG REGIO 
In launching the debate on the future of Cohesion policy during 2008, Commissioner Hübner 
reiterated three main themes.121 First, regional development in Europe and the role of 
Cohesion policy must been seen within the context of global challenges. Second, Cohesion 
policy must be more focussed on maximising its impact on EU competitiveness, growth and 
jobs. Third, changes are required to the governance of Cohesion policy in order to increase 
the focus on performance, to optimise the roles of different actors and levels, and to 
improve the coordination of the funds. 
Over the past year, Commissioner Hübner has elaborated on these themes, using the Barca 
Report to inform or reinforce DG REGIO thinking about the future orientation of Cohesion 
policy. Of particular note was a reflections paper presented at the April 2009 informal 
meeting of regional policy ministers,122 as well as subsequent speeches.123 The main 
message is that the policy we put in place in 2006 was the right one, butit must evolve 
further to meet the challenges of the 21st century124. Four sets of issues were highlighted. 
1. Consolidating the paradigm shift in Cohesion policy.  The EU needs a strong-based 
development policy that enables all regions to realise their economic potential, and all 
citizens to benefit from integration wherever they live. This involves mobilising people 
and businesses to make best use of tangible and intangible territorial assets. Cohesion 
policy enables all territories, lagging and non-lagging, to mobilise such assets and 
improve their contribution to overall economic efficiency and growth. 
The policy needs a stronger focus on narrowly defined core priorities  linked to 
innovation, entrepreneurship and development of integrated local strategies - to allow 
a Europe-wide critical mass of interventions to be achieved, focusing political and 
public attention on clear objectives. In all regions, promoting competitiveness requires 
emphasis on know-how, capacity-building, strategy development and networks. In the 
poorer regions, it is also necessary to address key bottlenecks to growth such as 
infrastructure deficits in transport, ICT, human resources and research. The policy also 
needs to ensure that lagging regions can benefit from knowledge and technology spill-
overs from leading regions. 
                                                 
120 Bachtler J (2009) International Conference Future of the Cohesion Policy and Integrated Local  
Development Prague, 26-27 March 2009, Conference Report (mimeo) 
121 Bachtler and Mendez (2008) op. cit. 
122 Reflection paper on future Cohesion policy, presented by Commissioner Danuta Hübner to the 
Informal Meeting of Ministers for Regional Policy, Mariánské Láznĕ, 22-24 April 2009. 
123 See, for example: First reaction to Barca report, Speech by Commissioner Danuta Hübner at the 
launch of the Barca report, 27 April 2009, Berlaymont, European Commission. Speech by 
Commissioner Danuta Hübner to a Meeting with the Regional Offices - Centre Borschette, 25 June 
2009. 
124 Ibid. 
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2. A greater focus on results. There is a need for a greater performance orientation, with 
a stronger focus on targeted outcomes and results, as well as a stronger monitoring and 
evaluation culture and commitment to learning. This includes comparable indicators 
across all Member States and investment in impact evaluation. 
3. Reinforcing the added value of Cohesion policy. More emphasis needs to be placed on 
the development of effective institutions. Improving delivery includes better 
coordination between Cohesion and sectoral policies at national and EU levels and an 
increased targeting of interventions (especially between Cohesion policy programmes 
and the Lisbon strategy, and for competitiveness measures to take account of low 
carbon and climate change objectives). Reinforcing the strategic dimension of the 
policy requires the strategic role of the Commission to be enhanced, especially the role 
of the Commission as strategic advisor to Member States and its scope to promote 
effective knowledge management. The introduction of a high-level political peer review 
mechanism should be considered. 
4. Strengthening and simplifying delivery mechanisms. To address the growing 
complexity of the policy requires a better balance between performance, simplification 
and assurance of financial legality and regularity. Management and control mechanisms 
should be tailored more closely to the nature of the intervention. The administrative 
burden for implementing bodies and beneficiaries must be reduced.125 The scope for 
reinforcing proportionality of procedures should be explored. More flexible spending 
rules are needed, especially to encourage risk-taking and experimentation. The role of 
financial engineering in increasing the leverage and impact of the policy should be 
enlarged. 
Many of these proposals for reform are shared by Member States. Based on a questionnaire 
circulated by the Czech Presidency, a joint communiqué was agreed by regional policy 
ministers at Mariánské Láznĕ. This underlined the relevant and long-term strategic role of 
the policy and acknowledged that Cohesion policy can play a role (as a complement to 
other policies) in helping regions deal with new challenges like globalisation, demographic 
change, energy and climate change. It agreed that the policy should be present across the 
whole EU territory although this was open to different interpretations. The communiqué 
also reiterated the principles of Cohesion policy (strategic planning, partnership, integrated 
policy approaches, etc) but called for better coordination among Cohesion policy and other 
EU policies, real simplification of delivery mechanisms, more coherence between the 
Funds, and the use of non-grant forms of financing. 
The communiqué is regarded by several Member States as an important political milestone 
(and a tribute to the Czech Presidency) although it was agreed with stated caveats that it 
did not pre-empt the outcome of the budget review or pre-define the shape of Cohesion 
policy after 2013. As noted above, a high-level group on the future of Cohesion policy is 
being convened to (in the words of the new Commissioner Paweã Samecki) provide an 
                                                 
125 A working group with Member State officials has been established to explore simplification 
measures for the current programme period. 
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informal platform for discussion between the Commission and Member States on the 
cohesion policy foundations. With a first meeting in October 2009, its starting point is the 
Mariánské Láznĕ reflection paper. The next milestone will be the publication of the Fifth 
Cohesion Report in 2010. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY ISSUES 
The aim of this paper has been to provide a review of the Cohesion policy debate over the 
past year. It began with a summary of the state-of-play with the budget review, covering 
the conclusion of the consultation exercise, reform ideas and the main Member State 
positions expressed, focusing particularly on the two largest elements of the budget  the 
Common Agricultural Policy and Cohesion policy. The paper then reviewed the analytical 
work conducted under the auspices of DG Regio and the emerging thinking within the DG on 
the directions of reform. This final section draws out a number of policy issues for further 
consideration. 
 (i) How relevant is the ‘place-based policy’ concept, as interpreted in the Barca Report 
for the debate on the future of Cohesion policy?  
In the Barca Report, the place-based policy concept is interpreted as a long-term strategy 
aimed at tackling persistent under-utilisation of potential and reducing persistent social 
exclusion in specific places through external interventions and multilevel governance. It 
promotes the supply of integrated goods and services tailored to contexts, and it triggers 
institutional changes. The concept is regarded as the only policy model appropriate for 
Cohesion policy. 
At the heart of the Barca Report recommendations are changes to the multi-level 
governance of the policy to ensure a stronger set of conditionalities in the relationship 
between Commission and national/regional levels, with greater strategic focus and 
performance. This would involve: 
x a new strategic framework for Cohesion policy, with an enhanced strategic 
dialogue between the Commission and Member States (or regions), based on a 
European Strategic Development Framework, setting out the major policy 
innovations, clear-cut principles for the core priorities and a set of indicators for 
assessing performance; and 
x a different contractual relationship, implementation and reporting aimed at results 
 based on a new contractual agreement (a National Strategic Development 
Contract) between the Commission and Member States, focused on performance 
and on the institutional requirements for intervention, coupled with 
implementation assessment by the Commission and strategic reporting. 
A second important dimension of the Barca proposals is greater transparency in the design 
and implementation of interventions. In part, this would be achieved by the performance 
focus above. It would also require an improved high-level political debate, with new 
information on performance and a renewed system of checks and balances among the 
European institutions, strengthened by creating a formal Council for Cohesion policy. 
A third aspect of the place-based approach is an emphasis on learning. In recognition of the 
fact that information on what works in specific contexts is imperfect, the mobilisation of 
knowledge gathering and dissemination is important. The Barca Report proposes: 
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x promoting experimentalism and mobilising local actors  through a better balance 
between incentivising local agents to risk and invest and preventing policy from 
being captured by local interests, by encouraging experimentalism, using a small 
fund for innovative territorial actions and using international expertise locally;  
x promoting the learning process through a move towards prospective impact 
evaluation - encouraging the design and implementation of counterfactual methods 
for assessing the impact of policy interventions, to improve understanding of what 
works, especially in a prospective sense, so that evaluation is designed together 
with the intervention, focusing attention on objectives and on the criteria for the 
selection of beneficiaries.  
Several of these proposals find some resonance in the principles for a future Cohesion 
policy outlined in the Member States communiqué at the Mariánské Láznĕ meeting. 
However, implementing these Barca Report measures would place much greater demands 
on national and regional authorities in designing and implementing Structural Funds 
interventions as well as requiring considerable trust in the capacity of the Commission to 
perform the role assigned to it. The questions are whether Member States are willing to 
support such far-reaching changes, and whether they would deliver the expected increase 
in performance. 
(ii) Is it feasible to focus Cohesion policy on a limited number of core priorities? 
In her reflections paper, Commissioner Hübner argues that to achieve the highest impact 
possible of the policy, it will be necessary to focus on a more limited number of core EU 
priorities. Two areas of particular importance are considered to be the Lisbon Strategy 
and sustainable development (notably responses to climate change). Similarly, the Barca 
Report advocates focusing the major share of Cohesion policy support on a limited number 
of objectives: innovation, climate, skills, social exclusion, children and ageing are put 
forward as possible candidates. Three criteria for deciding on priorities are also suggested: 
EU-wide relevance; their place-based nature; and verifiability.   
The question is how such a focus might be achieved. In order to demonstrate more clearly 
the impact of Cohesion policy, it would be desirable to build a critical mass of interventions 
on narrowly defined priorities with measurable indicators. In a general sense, thematic 
concentration is also supported by Member States, as the discussion at the Mariánské Láznĕ 
meeting demonstrated. 
However, the diversity of regional needs across the EU, and the different ways in which 
Structural Funds are utilised, present formidable obstacles to identifying and defining 
priorities for Cohesion policy acceptable to all Member States. For example, the response 
from some new Member States to the Barca Report has affirmed the need for Cohesion 
policy to support broad-based development and the scope to address bottlenecks such as 
infrastructure deficits. Other countries have questioned the justification for Cohesion policy 
to be involved in some of the priorities proposed. Lastly, the experience of earmarking in 
the current period provides only partial encouragement for thematic concentration: the 
Lisbon focus has certainly raised the profile of themes in the Community Strategic 
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Guidelines, but it has also demonstrated the creativity of Member States in interpreting the 
Guidelines as broadly as possible. 
(iii)  What is the scope for the management and implementation of Cohesion policy to 
be substantially simplified? 
The Commissioners reflections paper stated that the policy requires a better balance 
between performance, simplification and assurance of financial legality and regularity. 
This includes a reduction in the administrative burden for implementing bodies and 
beneficiaries, and exploration of the scope for reinforcing proportionality of procedures. 
The working group on simplification has made some progress in identifying procedures 
where the administrative burden could be rationalised. However, many programme 
managers and partners have urged more radical simplification, pointing to the increased 
bureaucracy, particularly associated with financial management, control and audit. 
Yet, it is not clear how simplification can be achieved. The pressure to reduce the 
proportion of irregularities in Cohesion policy spending from the European Parliament and 
European Court of Auditors (as well as from the Commission President and DG Budget) is 
unlikely to diminish. And it has to be recognised that implementing Cohesion policy through 
shared management within a multi-level governance system and with multiple actors and 
interests is inherently complex. This is after all the third consecutive reform debate where 
simplification is intended to be an objective of reform, the previous two reforms having 
failed to reduce significantly the administrative burden. The question here is whether 
simplification may require the principle of shared management to be fundamentally 
reconsidered. 
(iv) How will the crisis affect the debate on the future of Cohesion policy? 
As noted at the outset of this paper, the full regional impact of the crisis is not yet known. 
However, the accompanying EoRPA paper126 on the crisis reveals some of the emerging 
patterns. There have been sharp and steep falls in national GDP in many EU countries, with 
different projections about the pace of recovery  several major economies are still 
officially in recession. Regional unemployment has reached 20-25 percent in several Spanish 
regions. In many others it is currently on an upward trajectory or temporarily suppressed 
through short-time working subsidies. Two categories of regions are of particular concern: 
x structurally weaker regions (either lagging in development or whose restructuring 
after previous crises was incomplete) whose competiveness is weak and where 
there is often a high dependence on public spending and public sector employment, 
both threatened by cuts as governments deal with mounting deficits; and 
x industrial regions which adapted successfully to globalisation and technological 
change but whose enterprise profile and employment are dependent on sectors 
                                                 
126 Davies et al (2009) op. cit. 
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where there is overcapacity (notably automobile production), a collapse in export 
markets and strong international competition.  
The question is how the changing regional development challenges will affect the Cohesion 
policy debate. One possible effect may be on the emphasis given to policy objectives. As 
policy attention shifts from emergency crisis measures to longer term strategies, a higher 
priority is likely to be given to economic development policies that promote innovation and 
the knowledge economy (already evident in policy debates in Ireland and Spain) with 
Cohesion policy being seen as a relevant instrument for delivering these objectives. 
Equally, it may well be argued that sectoral policies are better suited for this task. 
Another issue is the spatial coverage of policy. Prior to the crisis, an increasing body of 
opinion was challenging the DG Regio view that Cohesion policy should operate throughout 
the EU. The meta-evaluations of EU spending conducted for the budget review, for 
example, saw merit only in providing support for poor countries/regions and territorial 
cooperation. The trends in GDP per head (see Section 4) were also indicating an increasing 
restriction of Convergence eligibility to Central and Eastern European countries. In 
response, a developing network of new statistical effect regions was already emerging to 
argue for a new transition category of regions between 75 and 80/90/100 percent of EU 
GDP per head. The crisis could have a twofold effect. First, the impact on GDP will affect 
the map of eligibility for Convergence funding (under the current criterion) and potentially 
also eligibility for the Cohesion Fund. Second, the rise in regional unemployment could 
prompt demands for unemployment to be given a higher weighting in financial allocation 
mechanisms and potentially for a resurrection of an Objective 2 for regions suffering from 
high (increases in) unemployment. 
 
 
